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Abstract  
In The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform, 
I explained how issues surrounding consumer and other adhesive 
arbitration agreements became divisive along predictable political lines 
(progressives vs. conservatives) and proposed an intermediate (or 
centrist) position to resolve those issues. However, The Politics of 
Arbitration Law did not argue the case for my proposals. It left those 
arguments for this Article, which makes the case against current 
(conservative) arbitration law, and a third article, which will make the 
case against progressive proposals to reform arbitration law. In other 
words, this Article stands out from the many other articles critiquing 
current arbitration law because this Article’s critique comes from a 
centrist, rather than progressive, perspective. For that reason, this 
Article’s critique may be more likely than progressive critiques to gain 
traction with lawmakers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The basic principle advanced in this Article is congruity. Arbitration 
law should be congruous with non-arbitration law. Specifically, adhesive 
arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other adhesion 
contracts, neither more nor less so. While conforming arbitration law to 
other law is generally good policy, this congruity principle should not be 
taken to the extreme. In a few respects,  adhesive arbitration agreements 
should be more enforceable than other adhesion contracts. These 
exceptions are necessary to preserve “arbitration” as that term is used in 
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governing law—primarily, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1—and in 
ordinary speech. 
In the United States, litigation is the default process of dispute 
resolution; that is, parties can contract into alternative processes of 
dispute resolution (such as arbitration), but if they do not, then each party 
retains the right to have the dispute resolved in litigation. Thus, to 
contract out of the litigation default and into arbitration is to trade away 
the right to litigate. 
In The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for 
Reform,2 I placed on a continuum five positions on the level of consent 
courts should require to enforce arbitration agreements.3 The continuum 
labels these positions as the Very Progressive Position, the Moderately 
Progressive Position, the Centrist Position, the Moderately Conservative 
Position, and the Very Conservative Position.4 Each position differs 
regarding the level of consent required for the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. The continuum, as a whole, reflects the political divide that 
has developed between progressives and conservatives regarding 
arbitration law.  
Generally, conservatives support and progressives oppose the law’s 
current position strongly enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements.5 Until 
1984, adhesive arbitration agreements were generally unenforceable.6 
However, from 1984 to 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided many cases 
that changed the law to result in routine enforcement of adhesive 
arbitration agreements.7 The Court’s pro-enforcement majorities nearly 
always included Justices appointed by Democratic presidents.8 These 
majorities, although creating dramatic changes in arbitration law, were not 
extreme in the political context of that era.9 Since then, however, the 
political center on consumer law has moved somewhat to the left while the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on adhesive arbitration law have moved further 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
 2. Stephen J. Ware, The Politics of Arbitration Law and Centrist Proposals for Reform, 
53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 711 (2016). 
 3. Id. at 725–26. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 713–14.  
 6. STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.13–.14 (3d 
ed. 2016). 
 7. Id. §§ 2.27–.28. 
 8. The one significant exception to this, and perhaps a precursor to the Court’s recent 
partisan or ideological arbitration voting, was a consumer arbitration case, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), in which the pro-enforcement majority consisted of 
five Republican-appointees while the four dissenters consisted of the two Democratic-appointees 
then on the Court plus Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, who was appointed by the first President 
Bush. Ware, supra note 2, at 721 & nn.49–54. 
 9. Ware, supra note 2, at 722. 
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right, resulting in governing decisions that overly diverge from the political 
mainstream.10 That divergence would be reduced, or even eliminated, if 
this Article’s centrist approach11 was adopted.  
As noted above, in The Politics of Arbitration Law I placed on a 
continuum five positions regarding the level of consent courts should 
require to enforce arbitration agreements.12 The Very Progressive 
Position would require post-dispute consent for all individuals’ 
arbitration agreements and the Moderately Progressive Position would 
enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements only when those agreements 
are not adhesive.13 So neither Progressive Position would enforce any 
adhesive arbitration agreements formed by individuals, such as 
consumers and employees. In contrast, the Centrist Position I advocate 
defends arbitration law’s use of contract law’s low standards of consent, 
which result in enforcement of most adhesive contract terms, including 
most adhesive arbitration agreements.14 Further to the right, both 
Conservative Positions not only use contract law’s low standards of 
consent, but also apply the separability doctrine, which prevents courts 
from hearing defenses to contract enforcement.15 The difference between 
the two Conservative Positions is that while the Moderately Conservative 
Position, like positions to its left, subjects arbitration agreements to the 
same limits as general contract law, the Very Conservative Position 
exempts arbitration agreements from limits relating to appealing legally 
erroneous decisions and to class waivers.16  
The Politics of Arbitration Law took the Centrist Position, arguing that 
adhesive arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other 
adhesive contracts.17 The Centrist Position rejects current law’s 
conservative-supported anomalies in which courts enforce adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesive contracts.18 This 
Article makes the arguments against those anomalies.  
Part I critiques current, conservative-supported arbitration law for 
failing, in three important and controversial respects, to conform to the 
principle that adhesive arbitration agreements should be no more 
enforceable than other adhesion contracts. Current law enforces adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts in 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Id. at 723.  
 11. See infra Appendix. 
 12. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 13. Ware, supra note 2, at 734. 
 14. Id. at 738–39.  
 15. Id. at 743. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 751. 
 18. Id. 
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three controversial respects: the separability doctrine, correction of 
legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers. 
First, current law applies the separability doctrine, which prevents 
courts from hearing defenses to contract enforcement, such as 
misrepresentation and duress, when the contract at issue has an arbitration 
clause.19 This Article opposes the separability doctrine and contends that 
courts should be available to hear defenses to the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses and to the contracts containing such clauses. The right 
to litigate is particularly important in the United States.20 Under the 
separability doctrine, however, courts hold that a party trades away her 
right to litigate by assenting to a contract that was induced by 
misrepresentation, duress, or other grounds constituting a legally-
recognized defense to contract enforcement.21 Thus, this Article’s 
Centrist Position rejects the separability doctrine, arguing instead that 
contract defenses should protect the right to litigate as fully as they 
protect other rights that can be traded away by adhesion contracts. 
Second, current law enforces arbitration agreements that trade away 
the right to appeal,22 resulting in little judicial review of arbitrators’ 
decisions, even arbitrators’ erroneous rulings on questions of law.  Courts 
occasionally vacate an arbitrator’s award on the ground that the arbitrator 
exhibited a “manifest disregard of law,”23 but “manifest disregard” 
requires much more than an error of law—it requires proof the arbitrator 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 
388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). 
 20. The judiciary and litigation have long played a larger role in the United States than in 
other democracies. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 13 (2001) (“[V]iewed in comparative perspective, the United States is distinctive . . . . It is 
especially inclined to authorize and encourage the use of adversarial litigation to . . . resolve 
disputes.”); id. at 16 (“Adversarial legalism gives the United States the most politically and 
socially responsive court system in the world. . . . [T]he judiciary and lawyers [are] more fully 
part of the governing process and more fully democratic in character.”); David Nelken, Beyond 
Compare? Criticizing “The American Way of Law,” 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 799, 819 (2003) 
(“What we can be certain of is that in these other places lawyers are less central and litigation is 
allowed a much smaller role than in the United States.”). 
 21. See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71. 
 22. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 500 (2009) (“Arbitration typically does not have an appeals 
process, unless the parties agree by contract to create one. Courts review arbitration awards only 
on narrow, usually procedural, grounds, and the United States Supreme Court has curtailed the 
ability of parties to expand that review by contract.” (footnotes omitted)); Maureen A. Weston, 
The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and Displacement of Agency 
Regulation, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 62–63 (2013) (“Arbitration awards are virtually 
unreviewable on the merits and are rarely vacated.”). 
 23. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)).  
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knew the law and chose to ignore it—so vacatur on this ground is 
extremely rare. Courts apply this overly deferential standard of review 
even in instances where the arbitration agreement calls for de novo 
review.24 In contrast, this Article proposes that an arbitrator’s legally 
erroneous decisions arising out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 
should be subject to de novo review when the question is of mandatory, 
as opposed to default, law.  
Third, following the Supreme Court’s 2011 AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion decision,25 courts generally enforce adhesive arbitral class 
waivers.26 This holding has since extended to contract law, generally.27 
Arbitration law, however, is not centrally concerned with class actions, 
which came into being after the FAA.28 Thus, this Article proposes that 
arbitration law defer to other law in deciding whether class waivers are 
enforceable.  
In sum, Part I of this Article discusses the three important and 
controversial ways current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements 
more broadly than other adhesion contracts and argues that these 
exceptions should end. In contrast, Part II notes the relatively 
uncontroversial ways in which courts should continue to enforce adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts. Under 
current law, adhesive arbitration agreements typically reduce discovery29 
and evidentiary rules.30 The FAA also mandates enforcement of adhesive 
agreements providing for an arbitrator rather than a jury.31 Enforcing 
adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion 
contracts on these three topics—discovery, evidence, and jury—is 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008).  
 25. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 26. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013); 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351–52. 
 27. Compare Grant v. Convergys Corp., No. 4:12-CV-496 (CEJ), 2013 WL 781898, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2013) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton 
Homes, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 682, 692 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), 
Birdsong v. AT&T Corp., No. C12-6175 TEH, 2013 WL 1120783, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), Killion v. KeHE Distribs., 885 F. Supp. 2d 874, 
882, 884–85 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver and citing Concepcion as 
support for the proposition that “collective actions may be waived”), and Palmer v. Convergys 
Corp., No. 7:10-cv-145 (HL), 2012 WL 425256, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (enforcing a non-
arbitral class waiver).  
 28. Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922–1947, 
31 F.R.D. 307, 512 (1963) (“[O]n September 16, 1938, three months after the adjournment of its 
session, the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] went into operation.”). 
 29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (finding lesser 
discovery in arbitration an insufficient reason to deny enforcement to adhesive employment 
arbitration agreement). 
 30. See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.  
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necessary to distinguish arbitration from litigation, and is not troubling 
under the Centrist Position, which would subject arbitration agreements’ 
provisions on these three topics to judicial policing through contract 
defenses such as unconscionability.  
I.  THE CASE FOR THE CENTRIST POSITION OVER THE CONSERVATIVE 
POSITIONS 
 This Part discusses the three important and controversial ways 
current law fails to conform to the principle that adhesive arbitration 
agreements should only be as enforceable as other adhesive contracts. 
This Part argues against these anomalies and thus for reforming 
arbitration law so it is more congruous with other law. 
A.  Overview  
Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly 
than other adhesion contracts in three important and controversial 
respects: 
(1) while contract defenses (such as misrepresentation and 
duress) protect other rights that adhesion contracts can 
trade away, the separability doctrine removes contract 
defenses’ protection from the main right traded away 
by an arbitration agreement—the right to litigate; 
(2) while courts do not enforce non-arbitration adhesion 
contracts prohibiting appeal, which trade away the right 
to correct legally erroneous decisions on mandatory-
law claims, courts routinely enforce adhesive 
arbitration agreements that effectively trade away that 
right; and 
(3) while courts, at least before Concepcion, rarely 
enforced non-arbitration adhesion contracts purporting 
to trade away the right to participate in a class action, 
courts frequently enforce such “class waivers” in 
adhesive arbitration agreements. 
In each of these respects, current law is more conservative than this 
Article’s Centrist Position of making adhesive arbitration agreements 
only as enforceable as other adhesion contracts. Therefore, the centrist 
proposals in this Article include:  
(1) rejecting the separability doctrine, so contract defenses 
protect the right to litigate as fully as they protect other 
rights that adhesion contracts can trade away; 
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(2) vacating arbitrators’ legally erroneous decisions on 
mandatory-law claims when the award arises out of 
adhesive or other pre-dispute arbitration agreements; 
and 
(3) treating arbitral class waivers like other class waivers, 
so the right to participate in a class action is no more 
easily traded away in an adhesive arbitration agreement 
than in an adhesive non-arbitration agreement. 
The following subsections of this Article address in turn the separability 
doctrine, legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers.  
B.  Use Contract Defenses to Protect the Right to Litigate Like Other 
Rights: Reject the Separability Doctrine 
The first important and controversial way current law makes 
adhesive arbitration agreements more enforceceable than other adhesion 
contracts is the separability doctrine, which prevents contract defenses 
from protecting the right to litigate. 
1.  The Separability Doctrine 
When a party opposes enforcement of an arbitration clause on the 
ground that the contract containing that clause is voidable due to  a 
contract-law defense—such as misrepresentation, duress, 
unconscionability, or illegality—the “separability doctrine” instructs 
courts to send the case to arbitration without first determining whether the 
facts prove the alleged defense.32 The separability doctrine, as reflected in 
the three Supreme Court decisions addressing it,33 treats the arbitration 
clause as a separately enforceable agreement from the contract containing 
it: If the alleged defense is not focused on the arbitration clause in 
particular, then the court enforces that clause to require arbitration of 
whether the contract containing it is enforceable, as well as arbitration of 
the merits of the claims asserted by one party against the other.34  
For instance, suppose Consumer sues Lender alleging that a year after 
Lender contracted with and lent to Consumer, Lender violated the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)35 by providing false information to a credit 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Ware, supra note 2, at 741–43. 
 33. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 34. Ware, supra note 2, at 743.  
 35. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x (2012)).  
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bureau.36 Suppose Lender then moves to stay the case and compel 
arbitration of Consumer’s claims based on the arbitration clause in the 
adhesion contract between Consumer and Lender. If Consumer opposes 
Lender’s motion to compel on the ground that Lender’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations induced Consumer to assent to the contract, the court 
will refuse to hear Consumer’s misrepresentation defense.37 Instead, the 
court will grant Lender’s motion to compel arbitration of Consumer’s 
FCRA claim, effectively telling Consumer to make her misrepresentation 
argument to the arbitrator.38 If the arbitrator rejects Consumer’s 
misrepresentation argument, then Consumer must arbitrate the merits of 
her FCRA claim or abandon it. Further, Consumer can only get judicial 
review of the arbitrator’s decision on misrepresentation after the 
arbitrator’s decision on the merits of her FCRA claim—by filing a motion 
to vacate the arbitration award.39 Even if Consumer persuades the arbitrator 
that Lender’s fraudulent misrepresentations induced her to assent to the 
contract, Consumer probably must nevertheless arbitrate the merits of her 
FCRA claim or abandon it.40  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1); see, e.g., Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 
426, 428 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding a credit card company liable under FCRA for insufficiently 
investigating before reporting adverse information about a debtor to credit reporting agencies). 
 37. These hypothetical facts are the consumer-context equivalent of the facts in the 
landmark Supreme Court decision adopting the separability doctrine. See Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04. If Prima Paint had argued that there was fraud 
“directed to the arbitration clause itself,” then the making of the arbitration agreement would have 
been an issue, and Prima Paint would have been entitled to a trial on that issue, but the FAA “does 
not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract 
generally.” Id. 
 38. See id. at 406–07; WARE, supra note 6, §§ 2.19–.21.  
 39. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 40. The separability doctrine holds that the arbitrator’s invalidation of the contract 
containing an arbitration clause does not invalidate the arbitration clause. See, e.g., William W. 
Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 143 (1997) (“[T]he separability doctrine permits arbitrators to 
invalidate the main contract (e.g., for illegality or fraud in the inducement) without the risk that 
their decision will call into question the validity of the arbitration clause from which they derive 
their power.”); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68 (2d ed. 
2001) (“Another possible consequence of the separability doctrine is that, if an arbitral tribunal or 
court concludes that the parties’ entire underlying contract was void, that conclusion would not 
necessarily deprive the parties’ arbitration agreement—and hence, in a Catch-22 turn, the 
arbitrators’ award—of validity.”); Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in 
International Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 
13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 20–21 (2002) (“[S]eparability means that . . . a party’s challenge to 
the validity of the underlying contract does not automatically deprive the arbitral tribunal of 
jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the challenged contract.”). 
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What the previous paragraph said about misrepresentation is also true 
of other contract defenses, such as mistake,41 duress,42 undue influence,43 
unconscionability,44 frustration of purpose,45 illegality,46 and probably 
incapacity.47 Suppose that instead of arguing Lender’s misrepresentation 
induced her to enter into the contract containing the arbitration clause, 
Consumer argued that duress induced her—Lender pointed a gun at 
Consumer’s head and said “sign the contract or I’ll shoot you.” Although 
no allegations that extreme have yet found their way into a reported case 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 629–30 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 528–29 (1st 
Cir. 1985). But see Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1066 (10th Cir. 2004) (hearing the argument 
that the arbitration agreement was voidable due to mistake rather than sending the case to an 
arbitrator, without discussing the severability doctrine or Prima Paint).  
 42. See SBRMCOA, LLC v. Bayside Resort, Inc., 707 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
Condominium Association’s coercion claim is arbitrable because it is a challenge to the validity 
(rather than the formation) of [the contract containing the arbitration clause].”); In re FirstMerit 
Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. 2001) (“[T]he defenses of unconscionability, duress, 
fraudulent inducement, and revocation . . . must specifically relate to the Arbitration Addendum 
itself, not the contract as a whole, if they are to defeat arbitration. Defenses that pertain to the 
entire installment contract can be arbitrated.” (footnote omitted)); Service Corp. Intern. v. Lopez, 
162 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 2005) (“Th[e] issue [of duress] relates to the contract as a whole 
and not solely the arbitration provision. It is therefore an issue to be decided in arbitration.”). But 
see Flannery v. Tri-State Div., 402 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[P]laintiff’s claim 
of duress challenges the existence of the contract itself, and therefore relates to all the clauses and 
provisions in it, including the arbitration clause. The argument that the arbitration clause is invalid 
and unenforceable, therefore, is not barred by the rule in Prima Paint.”). 
 43. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 
1981) (duress and undue influence); Lake Erie Towing v. Walter, No. 1:07-cv-02312, 2007 WL 
2907496, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2007) (“The Defendants’ Undue Influence Claim Challenges 
the Contract Generally and Therefore Belongs in Front of the Arbitrator, not the Court.”). 
 44. Substantive unconscionability of contract terms other than the arbitration clause is an 
issue for the arbitrator. See Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 F.3d 
721, 726–27 (8th Cir. 2003). For cases holding that arbitrators, not courts, assess 
unconscionability of container contract, see WARE, supra note 6, § 2.25. 
 45. See Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d at 528–29 (“[T]he arbitration clause is 
separable from the contract and is not rescinded by [defendant’s] attempt to rescind the entire 
contract based on . . . frustration of purpose.”); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 
F.2d 1263, 1271 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 46. See Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 502–03 (2012) (noting that the 
arbitrator, rather than the court, determines questions as to whether an employee’s non-
competition agreement is void as against public policy); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442, 448–49 (2006). 
 47. Federal courts have split on the question of mental incapacity. Compare Spahr v. Secco, 
330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (a court deciding defense of mental incapacity), with 
Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (an arbitrator deciding defense 
of mental incapacity). A related question is a minor’s lack of capacity to contract. See H & S 
Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630–31 (Ala. 2001) (allowing limited discovery on 
minority issue at time of motion to compel arbitration in the trial court); Douglass v. Pflueger 
Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 138–39 (Haw. 2006).  
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on the separability doctrine, other duress allegations have, and courts have 
applied the separability doctrine to grant the motion to compel arbitration, 
effectively telling the party in Consumer’s role to make her duress 
argument to the arbitrator.48 These decisions are straightforward 
applications of the Supreme Court decisions adopting and articulating the 
separability doctrine. That doctrine calls for duress arguments, including 
those alleging contracts signed at gunpoint, to be arbitrated rather than 
litigated.49  
The same goes for arguments that the contract containing the 
arbitration clause is unconscionable. Unconscionability may be the most 
frequently asserted contract defense in the adhesion-contract context. 
Due to the separability doctrine, arbitrators, rather than courts, initially 
hear unconscionability arguments when a party to the arbitration 
agreement, such as Lender, requests that.50  
Suppose however, instead of arguing that the contract containing the 
arbitration clause is unconscionable, Consumer argues that the arbitration 
clause itself is unconscionable. Before 2010, a court likely would have 
heard and resolved that argument (rather than sending it to the arbitrator), 
and a large body of case law developed about which arbitration clauses 
were unconscionable.51 However, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,52 enforced a clause that said:  
[T]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or 
agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute 
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or 
formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any 
claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or 
voidable.53  
In Rent-A-Center, Jackson argued that the arbitration clause was 
unconscionable, so he should have been free to litigate, rather than 
arbitrate, his claims against Rent-A-Center.54 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 121 (2007). 
 49. See id. at 121–22. 
 50. For cases holding that arbitrators, not courts, assess unconscionability of container 
contracts, see WARE, supra note 6, § 2.25. 
 51. See id.; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (2008); Susan Landrum, 
Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State Courts Apply the 
Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 776 (2014); Susan 
Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 
BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–96 (2004). 
 52. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
 53. Id. at 66. 
 54. Id. 
 
1238 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
rejected Jackson’s argument on the ground that the just-quoted 
“delegation clause” constituted his agreement to arbitrate whether other 
portions of his arbitration clause were unconscionable.55 By contrast, had 
Jackson argued that the delegation clause itself was unconscionable, the 
Supreme Court suggested a court, rather than an arbitrator, would hear 
that argument.56 In other words, Rent-A-Center seems to treat the 
delegation clause as separable from the broader arbitration clause in much 
the same way as the separability doctrine treats an arbitration clause as 
separable from the still-broader container contract.57 So in some cases 
current law provides that courts will not initially hear a defense to 
contract enforcement even when that defense focuses specifically on the 
arbitration clause itself rather than on the whole contract containing the 
arbitration clause. And stepping back from Rent-A-Center and delegation 
clauses to the longstanding, basic separability doctrine, courts generally 
will not initially hear a contract defense applying to the whole contract.58  
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 73. 
 56. See id. at 72 (“[U]nless Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we 
must treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the 
validity of the Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator.”). Few reported cases since Rent-A-Center 
address arguments that the delegation clause is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Most 
of these enforce the delegation clause. See Halliday v. Beneficial Fin. I, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-708, 
2013 WL 693022, at *3, *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2013) (“Because the Court concludes that the 
delegation provision is not unconscionable, the threshold issue of whether the remainder of the 
arbitration clause is unconscionable is a matter for arbitration.”); Dean v. Draughons Junior Coll., 
Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (enforcing the delegation clause and sending 
to arbitration the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable); Chung v. Nemer, 
No. C12-4608 PJH, 2012 WL 5289414, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (enforcing the delegation 
clause and granting the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration); Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., 
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that “it will be for the arbitrator to consider 
the conscionability of the agreement as a whole” and rejecting the argument that delegation clause 
was unconscionable).  
 57. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. 
REV. 1103, 1121 (2011) (“Rent-A-Center extended the separability principle by treating the 
arbitration agreement itself as entailing two separate contracts.”); David Horton, The Federal 
Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1058 n.181 (2012) (“[T]he 
Court conceptualized the delegation clause as an independent arbitration clause (‘an agreement to 
arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement’) within a broader contract to 
arbitrate (the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims).”).  
For cases applying Rent-A-Center, see, for example, Momot v. Mastro, 652 F.3d 982, 988 
(9th Cir. 2011) (finding that language in an arbitration agreement providing that parties agree to 
arbitrate any dispute that “‘arises out of or relates to . . . the validity or application of any of the 
provisions of this Section 4’ . . . constitutes ‘an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning 
the arbitration agreement”’ under Rent-A-Center); Hawkins v. Region’s, 944 F. Supp. 2d 528, 
530–31 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (“The court recognizes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson 
might be regarded by some as creating a legal ‘black hole’ which inevitably sucks in disputes and 
sends them to arbitration (at least in cases involving a delegation clause).”). 
 58. See Ware, supra note 2, at 742.  
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The separability doctrine, including Rent-A-Center’s extension of it to 
delegation clauses, is generally supported by conservatives—from the 
Republican-appointed Supreme Court Justices, who cast all five majority 
votes in Rent-A-Center;59 to the Chamber of Commerce, which filed an 
amicus brief for Rent-A-Center;60 to Republican members of Congress, 
who oppose the separability-repealing Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).61 
In contrast, progressives—including the co-sponsors of the AFA62 and 
the dissenters in Rent-A-Center63—provide the bulk of the opposition to 
the separability doctrine. I have long opposed the separability doctrine64 
and continue to believe that courts should be able to initially hear 
defenses to the enforcement of arbitration clauses and to the contracts 
containing arbitration clauses. A proposed law reform to this effect, 
written as a rule the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau could enact, 
is in the Appendix. 
2.  The Case Against the Separability Doctrine 
Before holding that a party has traded away her right to litigate, should 
the law require an enforceable contract or merely a contract that might or 
might not be enforceable? That is the question addressed by the 
separability doctrine, which requires only a contract, not necessarily an 
enforceable contract, to trade away the right to litigate and substitute 
arbitration for litigation.65 If a contract defense, such as 
misrepresentation,66 applies to an entire contract—to all of its clauses, 
including the arbitration clause—then that contract is not enforceable but 
is nevertheless sufficient under the separability doctrine to trade away the 
right to litigate. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 64. 
 60. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 WL 783668.  
 61. H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); David Lazarus, Bill Aims to Restore Consumers’ 
Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/business/la-fi-
lazarus-20111018. 
 62. H.R. 1844 (“The applicability of this chapter to an agreement to arbitrate and the 
validity and enforceability of an agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by a 
court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges 
the arbitration agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing 
such agreement.”). 
 63. Ware, supra note 2, at 720 (showing that dissenting Justices in Rent-A-Center were all 
appointed by Democratic presidents). 
 64. Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
83, 128–38, 159–60 (1996). 
 65. Ware, supra note 2, at 743. 
 66. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.1. 
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In contrast, this Article argues that if a party who seeks to litigate a 
claim asserts a defense to the enforcement of her contract containing an 
arbitration clause, then a court should bar litigation of the claim only if 
the court concludes the elements of the defense are not present. In other 
words, only an enforceable contract should be enough to opt out of the 
litigation default and into arbitration. The courthouse door should be open 
to parties asserting defenses to enforcement of their contracts containing 
arbitration clauses and should be closed to them only if they formed an 
enforceable contract in which they agreed to arbitrate. 
This conclusion rests on the importance in protecting parties’ rights of 
both the litigation default and contract defenses. In the United States, 
access to the courts—the right to litigate—is basic to our system of 
government.67 Making this right alienable through pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements is controversial, and rejected by those who hold the Very 
Progressive Position, including the many advocates of the Arbitration 
Fairness Act.68 Even more controversial is making the right to litigate 
alienable through adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements, an 
approach rejected by both the Moderately and Very Progressive 
Positions.69 
In contrast to the two Progressive Positions, which either never 
enforce individuals’ pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate or enforce only 
those to which the individual “non-adhesively” consented, the Centrist 
Position this Article advocates defends arbitration law’s use of contract 
law’s low standards of consent, which enforce most adhesive contract 
terms, including most adhesive arbitration clauses.70 However contract 
law’s standards of consent can properly be low only because they are 
supplemented by contract law’s defenses. These defenses are contract 
law’s main tools to soften the sometimes-harsh effects of those low 
consent standards.71 Thus, arbitration law can properly subject the right 
to litigate to contract law’s low standards of consent only if arbitration 
law also protects that right with contract law’s defenses. In other words, 
courts can properly enforce adhesive arbitration agreements only if the 
separability doctrine is repealed.72  
 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Ware, supra note 2, at 727. 
 68. Id. at 732–34. 
 69. Id. at 734–38. 
 70. Id. at 738–41. 
 71. See Ware, supra note 48, at 111.  
 72. For twenty years, I have advocated enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements, see 
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist 
Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 213 (1998) [hereinafter Ware, 
Consumer], and repealing the separability doctrine. See Ware, supra note 64, at 86. 
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As just argued, contract defenses are important and thoroughly 
interwoven with contract law’s low “objective manifestation-of-assent” 
standards of consent, so separating the two, as the separability doctrine 
does, is unwise. They are two sides of the same coin. Contract scholars 
of the Right as well as of the Left recognize that the defenses are 
thoroughly interwoven with “manifestation-of-assent.” As libertarian 
contracts scholar Randy Barnett puts it, contract defenses “describ[e] 
circumstances that, if proved to have existed, deprive the manifestation 
of assent of its normal moral, and therefore legal, significance.”73 In 
short, the separability doctrine deprives the right to litigate of the 
protection offered by contract law’s defenses and thus enforces 
agreements (manifestations of assent) to alienate that right under 
circumstances that deprive the agreements of their normal moral 
significance and thus should also deprive the agreements of their legal 
significance. This, at bottom, is why the separability doctrine should be 
repealed. 
3.  The Separability Doctrine is Not Merely a Default Rule or 
Presumption 
The strongest argument for the separability doctrine is that it is merely 
a default rule.74 A default rule is a legal rule that governs in the absence 
of an enforceable contract term to the contrary.75 For example, in a sale 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318 (1986); 
see also JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 (6th ed. 2009) (stating 
that under circumstances of duress, “consent is real enough; the vice of it is that it was coerced in 
a manner that society brands as wrongful”); id. § 9.10(a) (describing broad categories of undue 
influence, one of which involves using “psychological position in an unfair manner to induce the 
subservient party to consent to an agreement to which the other party would not otherwise have 
consented”); Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 57, 75 (2012) (noting that contract defenses such as mistake and incompetence 
“rest on the notion that the parties would not have consented had they known about the mistake 
or had the capacity to consent”); Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 
52 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 405 (2014) (describing “defenses said to go to the quality of the mutual 
assent . . . includ[ing] duress, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, mutual 
mistake, and unilateral mistake, the presence of which will make a contract unenforceable due to 
lack of ‘consent’”). 
 74. See Richard E. Speidel, International Commercial Arbitration: Implementing the New 
York Convention, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. 
WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 185, 260 n.284 (2006) 
(characterizing the separability doctrine as a “default rule”); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57, 
at 1121 (“Separability permitted the development of a default rule for allocation of authority. 
Under that default rule, courts resolve challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
and arbitrators resolve challenges to the enforceability of the underlying substantive contract.”).  
 75. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete 
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”); Yair Listokin, The Meaning of 
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of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the default rule is 
that the seller’s place of business is the place for delivery of the goods, 
but the parties can opt out of that default with a contract term requiring 
delivery at some other location.76 
Default rules generally should, many argue, conform to what most 
contracting parties want, so fewer parties have to incur the costs of 
negotiating and drafting a contract term to replace the default rule.77 
Along these lines, defenders of the separability doctrine argue that most 
parties to contracts containing arbitration clauses would want arbitrators, 
rather than courts, to initially hear defenses to enforcement of those 
contracts. Thus, these separability-defenders argue, this should be the 
default rule, and if particular parties instead want courts to initially hear 
such defenses, then those parties can write that into their agreement and 
opt out of the default rule. For example, Professor Christopher Drahozal 
writes, “[S]o long as the parties have manifested assent to the main 
contract [containing an arbitration clause] (even if there may be a defense 
to enforcement), it is at least plausible to presume (i.e., to treat as a 
default) that they would want an arbitrator rather than a court to 
adjudicate that defense.”78  
This presumption, however, seems often unrealistic, especially in the 
context of consumer adhesion contracts, as in the FCRA example above. 
When sophisticated parties negotiate and draft a custom contract, they 
                                                                                                                     
Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 397, 399 (2010) (“Contracts are 
inevitably incomplete. One of contract law’s primary roles consists of filling in the gaps of 
contracts with default rules.”); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules 
and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1424 (2014) (“Contract law . . . provides 
the parties with numerous default rules that become part of their contracts unless the parties 
implicitly or explicitly reject them.”).  
 76. U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 77. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (“We treat corporate law as a standard-form contract, supplying terms 
most venturers would have chosen . . . . [C]orporate law should contain the terms people would 
have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently 
low.”); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper 
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (1985) (“The ambition of the law governing the debtor-
creditor relationship, including fraudulent conveyance law, should provide all the parties with the 
type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain 
over all aspects of their deal.”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: 
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (“Ideally, 
the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting parties 
would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction.”). 
 78. Christopher R. Drahozal, Buckeye Check Cashing and the Separability Doctrine, 1 
Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 55, 87 n.155 (2011) (citing Alan Scott Rau, “Separability” in the 
United States Supreme Court, 1 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1, 4 (2006) [hereinafter Rau, 
Separability]; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of “Consent,” 24 ARB. 
INT’L 199, 221 (2008) [hereinafter Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction]). 
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may think about whether courts or arbitrators will, in a potential dispute 
that has not arisen yet, decide the parties’ arguments that their contract 
was usurious, unconscionable, or induced by fraud or a gun to the head; 
those sophisticated parties might even want the arbitrator to decide those 
arguments. But it is doubtful the typical consumer borrower even notices 
the arbitration clause in her adhesion contract, let alone thinks through 
the division of authority between arbitrator and court in a potential 
dispute enough to have wants about what the arbitrator, as opposed to the 
court, should decide.79 And if the typical consumer borrower did, at the 
time of contract formation, have a preference about who should decide 
whether the contract is usurious, unconscionable, or induced by fraud or 
a gun to the head, the borrower might well prefer the court, rather than 
arbitrator. 
More fundamentally, the problem with the separability-is-just-a-
good-default-presumption argument is that it treats the parties’ signatures 
on (or other manifestations of assent to) a contract containing an 
arbitration clause as if they are the only legally relevant fact. The 
separability-is-just-a-good-default-presumption argument thus overlooks 
the other legally relevant fact: litigation is the default process of dispute 
resolution so, before signing, each party had a right to litigate any 
disputes that might arise between them and neither party had a right to 
arbitrate such disputes.80 Therefore, courts cannot properly treat their 
signatures as breaking a tie between otherwise equally strong claims by 
litigation and arbitration to resolve their disputes.  
Instead, the pre-signing claim of litigation to resolve their disputes is 
far stronger than the pre-signing claim of arbitration to resolve their 
disputes, so the question is whether the signatures are weighty enough to 
more than offset that very strong pre-signing presumption of litigation 
over arbitration. A signature induced by misrepresentation, duress, or 
other circumstances constituting a contract defense is simply not that 
weighty. That is, a signature under circumstances that “deprive [that] 
manifestation of assent of its normal moral . . . significance”81 is not 
weighty enough to more than offset the pre-signing litigation default and 
thus alienate the right to litigate. A signature or other manifestation of 
assent needs to be made in circumstances free of a contract defense to 
acquire moral significance sufficient to offset the pre-agreement 
litigation default and thus alienate the right to litigate. For example, 
almost no moral significance attaches to a signature obtained at gunpoint. 
Yet the separability-is-just-a-good-default-presumption argument 
presumes that a signature obtained at gunpoint retains much of a typical 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See, e.g., Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 431–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting 
that credit card arbitration clauses were not “visible or meaningful to consumers”). 
 80. See supra notes 1–2, 20 and accompanying text.   
 81. See Barnett, supra note 73, at 318. 
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signature’s moral significance. At the least, the separability-is-just-a-
good-default-presumption argument requires a coherent and practical 
way for separability cases to distinguish signatures at gunpoint from more 
common contract-defense allegations that, if proven, drain less moral 
significance from the signature. No one has convincingly provided that 
argument.82 
4.  The Separability Doctrine’s Application to Forum-Selection Clauses 
Distinguished  
Another argument for the separability doctrine begins with the 
assertion that it applies not only to arbitration clauses (agreements 
choosing arbitration over litigation) but also to forum-selection clauses 
(agreements choosing litigation in one jurisdiction over litigation in 
another jurisdiction). Here, assume all relevant jurisdictions and parties 
are within the United States, as a later subsection of this Article addresses 
the separability doctrine in the international arbitration context. To 
reiterate, the argument under consideration is that because the 
separability doctrine applies to contracts containing forum-selection 
clauses then it should also apply to contracts containing arbitration 
clauses. Supporting this argument is the fact that most courts have applied 
the separability doctrine to forum-selection clauses, thus holding that 
only the court named in the clause should resolve an argument that the 
contract containing that clause was fraudulently induced.83 However, 
some of these cases are international,84 and the rest seem to involve 
                                                                                                                     
 82. The best argument along those lines is Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits 
of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 499 n.221, 514 n.263 (2011) 
(distinguishing “a signature at gunpoint [which] can only mean that the arbitration clause [along 
with all the contract’s other clauses] was induced by coercion,” from a misrepresentation about a 
non-arbitration aspect of the main contract—“say, about a consulting business (as in Prima Paint 
itself) [which would not] be pertinent—transposable—to the arbitration agreement”). The 
problem with this argument is that, as Professor Rau acknowledges, “hornbook Contract law for 
the last century has treated misrepresentation as ‘a defense that (if proven) makes all the terms of 
the contract unenforceable.’” Id. at 501 n.227. Professor Rau advocates an arbitration-only 
exception to this venerable contract law on misrepresentation, but such an arbitration-only 
exception seems unwise for two reasons: (1) it would be hard for courts to apply in practice 
(complexities avoided by a century of “hornbook contract law” are probably too complex to be 
worthwhile); and (2) it would deprive the right to litigate of some of the protection the 
misrepresentation defense provides other rights that parties can trade away by contract.  
 83. Drahozal, supra note 78, at 84 & n.145. 
 84. Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding 
“[o]nly when we can discern the [forum-selection] clause itself was obtained in contravention of 
the law will the federal courts disregard it and proceed to judge the merits” and basing the decision 
to uphold forum selection clause, in part, on international “comity concerns” (emphasis added)); 
Haynsworth v. Lloyd’s of London, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Fraud and overreaching 
must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it.”). 
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agreements between businesses,85 as opposed to consumer or 
employment adhesion contracts.  
The Eighth Circuit refused to apply the separability doctrine to a 
forum-selection clause. It held that “in a situation where a fiduciary 
relationship (such as between a commodities broker and its customer) is 
created by a contract tainted by fraud, the person defrauded can not be 
held to the contractual forum selection clause.”86 The Eighth Circuit’s 
rejection of a separability doctrine for forum-selection clauses is sound 
for the same reasons given above for rejecting the separability doctrine 
for arbitration clauses. Moreover, trading away the right to litigate, as an 
arbitration agreement does, trades away a more fundamental right than 
merely trading away the right to litigate in one U.S. jurisdiction’s courts 
rather than in another’s. The fifty states’ courts are less different from 
each other than they are from arbitration. Therefore, the separability 
doctrine in forum-selection clauses is at best weak support for the 
separability doctrine in arbitration agreements. 
5.  The Separability Doctrine in International Transactions 
Distinguished 
As explained above, the case against the separability doctrine is best 
understood by starting with the recognition that litigation is the default 
process of dispute resolution, so before contracting each party had a right 
to litigate and no right to arbitrate.87 Only when starting with that pre-
contracting baseline can one coherently ask whether an arbitration 
agreement, such as Consumer’s adhesive agreement with Lender in the 
FCRA example above, acquires enough moral significance from contract 
law’s low “manifestation of assent” standards to trade away Consumer’s 
right to litigate, or whether, as this Article contends, only agreements 
untainted by a contract defense acquire that level of moral significance.88  
                                                                                                                     
 85. Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Assocs. in Urology, 453 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“Defendant here offers no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching on the part of 
Plaintiff . . . in inducing Defendant to agree to inclusion of the forum selection clause in the 
agreements.”); Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[It is] 
settled law that unless there is a showing that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation induced the 
party opposing a forum selection clause to agree to inclusion of that clause in the contract, a 
general claim of fraud or misrepresentation as to the entire contract does not affect the validity of 
the forum selection clause.”). 
 86. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier–Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69; see also Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build 
It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 580–81 (2007) (describing the right to litigate as “fundamental, 
constitutional, and set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 36–40 (discussing an FCRA example) and notes 
65–73 (discussing importance of contract defenses in ensuring agreements’ moral significance). 
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To my knowledge, no defense of the separability doctrine 
acknowledges: 
(1)  Litigation is the default process of dispute 
resolution; 
(2)  so each party has a pre-agreement right to litigate; 
and 
(3)  the separability doctrine deprives the right to litigate 
of the protections afforded by contract law’s 
defenses.  
In other words, defenders of the separability doctrine do not begin 
with the litigation default and pre-agreement right to litigate before 
asking what process the law should require to trade away that right, as 
this Article contends they should.  
Perhaps separability defenders do not start with the litigation default 
and pre-agreement right to litigate because many separability defenders 
often write on international arbitration.89 In the more anarchic international 
environment, litigation is not the default process of dispute resolution to 
nearly the same degree as domestic litigation is the default process in the 
United States. The international arena lacks a government able to impose 
its courts’ jurisdiction and judgments on all relevant parties, and 
cooperation among governments has not closed this gap. In other words, 
the pre-agreement “right to litigate” has less value in the international 
context because enforcement of courts’ judgments across international 
borders tends to be less reliable than it is within the United States.90 In 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See infra notes 92–93.  
 90. While the U.S. Constitution requires each state’s courts to give other states’ courts’ 
judgments “Full Faith and Credit,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, no comparable treaty among nations 
exists. See Emilio Bettoni, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments Despite 
the Lack of Assets, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 157–58 (2013) (“Contrary to foreign arbitral 
awards, which are widely recognized and enforced . . . [t]he only attempt to create a multilateral 
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign money judgments on a global 
scale . . . failed to attract the required executions and ratifications . . . .”); Steven C. Nelson, 
Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT’L LAW. 187, 190 (1989) (noting the 
difficulty in recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments because these actions “depend on 
notions of comity and fairness that are often vaguely and inconsistently articulated”); S.I. Strong, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 
33 REV. LITIG. 45, 48, 51–52 (2014) (explaining that a proposed Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments has thus far “proved impossible to enact,” and although work 
continues, “there is no guarantee that the project would be successful”); Yuliya Zeynalova, The 
Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix 
It?, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150, 152 (2013) (“[T]he absence of an international enforceability 
regime for foreign judgments leaves a void in the realm of private international law that sits in 
stark contrast to the well-established mechanism for enforcing foreign arbitral awards.”). 
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short, international arbitration is less subordinate to international litigation 
than domestic arbitration is to domestic litigation.  
If the international arena lacks a strong pre-agreement right to litigate 
in a court with power to compel the other party to comply with the court’s 
judgments, then perhaps the only legally relevant fact in an international 
case is the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, so the separability-is-just-a-
good-default-presumption argument has more force internationally than 
it does in the domestic U.S. context.91 Furthermore, the types of parties 
typically forming international arbitration agreements—governments and 
large businesses—may generally protect themselves from the conduct 
that would give rise to a contract defense better than the individuals who 
often form domestic arbitration agreements. For example, individuals 
seem more vulnerable to undue influence, unconscionability, duress, and 
misrepresentation than governments and large businesses because 
governments and large businesses seem harder than ordinary individuals 
to bully and trick.92  
For these reasons, the case for the separability doctrine is stronger in 
the international context than in the domestic U.S. context. So it is 
understandable that the most eloquent advocates of the separability 
doctrine tend to be those who have written extensively on international 
arbitration.93 Their arguments apply less to the domestic U.S. context, 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
 92. See Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: 
Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 
(2003) (“There is less of a need for protection of clients in international commercial arbitration 
because the parties are almost without exception international business entities. There are no 
personal injury victims, no civil rights claimants, and no criminal defendants. As participants in 
the global marketplace, the consumers of international commercial arbitration presumably have 
significant financial resources and are sophisticated.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Jacob R. 
Schaffer, Note, Rescuing the International Arbitral Model: Identifying the Problem in Natural 
Resources Trade and Development, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 318–19 (2011) (stating that many 
of the companies seeking arbitration in international business are large companies). 
 93. See Rau, Separability, supra note 78; Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction, supra note 78; see also 
STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 18, 22 (1987); 
John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-
Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1116, 1119 (2003); 
Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57, at 1121; William W. Park, Determining Arbitral 
Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 
143 (1997); Smit, supra note 40, at 22–23; Speidel, supra note 74, at 260 & n.284. By contrast, 
scholars criticizing the separability doctrine tend to have written more on domestic than 
international arbitration. See Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, 
Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 195–96 (1999); 
Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: 
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 826–
28 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1391, 
1456–58 (1991). 
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especially the domestic U.S. context of adhesive arbitration agreements 
(which no other nation enforces at all94) enforced against consumers, 
employees, and other individuals. In short, the persuasiveness of the case 
against the separability doctrine grows with the importance of (1) the 
right to litigate and (2) the protection provided by contract law’s defenses 
to enforcement. Each of these factors is generally less important in the 
international context than in the domestic context, especially the domestic 
adhesive context. 
6.  The Downsides of Repealing the Separability Doctrine 
Repealing the separability doctrine would have downsides. A non-
separability rule would have a court available to resolve contract defenses 
before an arbitrator resolves the merits of the claims. This would allow a 
party to add an extra procedural step (litigating contract defenses) that 
would generally make getting to arbitration of the cases’ merits slower 
and costlier than it is under the separability doctrine, which resolves in 
one forum both contract defenses and the merits of cases.95 In addition, a 
non-separability rule would often have a court resolving issues 
intertwined with the merits of the case that will go to the arbitrator if the 
court finds no defense.96 In short, repealing the separability doctrine will 
have downsides. However, ensuring that courts do not compel arbitration 
unless the parties have formed an enforceable contract requiring 
arbitration is worth bearing those downsides.  
C.  Vacate Legally Erroneous Arbitration Awards on Mandatory-Law 
Claims 
After contract defenses (the separability doctrine), the second important 
and controversial topic on which current law enforces adhesive arbitration 
agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts relates to the 
adjudicator’s (court’s or arbitrator’s) errors of law.  
                                                                                                                     
 94. Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, 
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT 127, 138–40 (2006); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law 
in Comparative Perspective: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 865 
(2002). 
 95. The non-separability procedure would allow a party who expects to lose in arbitration 
to delay arbitration by fabricating an allegation that the container contract is unenforceable. See 
Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is easy to cry 
fraud.”); W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 540 (1997) 
(“[I]t is all too easy for a party seeking to derail an arbitration at its inception to claim that the 
main agreement was or had become invalid.”). Perhaps parties who refuse to go to arbitration 
without a court’s determination that the container contract is enforceable should, if they lose on 
that determination, be required to pay the other side’s legal fees and costs. Additional sanctions 
might also be imposed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 96. See Ware, supra note 48, at 114–17.  
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1.  Legally Erroneous Decisions by the Initial Adjudicator 
Consider a hypothetical adhesion contract that does not have an 
arbitration clause but rather provides that litigation of any disputes shall 
end with the trial court’s judgment. In other words, the contract says the 
parties have no right to appeal. This hypothetical contract provision 
would be extremely unusual and probably unenforceable. Attorney Colter 
Paulson searched for cases involving such provisions and concluded that 
“[o]utside of the arbitration context, there are very few cases dealing with 
pre-dispute waivers of the right to appeal.”97 In fact, Paulson found only 
two cases since 1928, one of which he concluded “was simply a weak 
attempt to call a payment provision an appellate waiver and was rejected 
as such.”98 The other case involved an agreement that was not truly pre-
dispute,99 let alone pre-dispute and adhesive. Therefore, it seems no 
reported case since 1928 involves a truly pre-dispute contract provision 
prohibiting appeal.  
The longstanding absence of cases involving pre-dispute agreements 
prohibiting appeal suggests that such agreements are extremely unusual. 
Their unusualness may be entirely due to party choice; perhaps parties 
place great importance on the right to appeal, so they do not agree to give 
it up. However, arbitration in the United States rarely provides a right to 
appeal—appellate panels of arbitrators are very rare100—and many 
parties nevertheless agree to arbitrate. So the fact that very few parties 
form non-arbitration agreements prohibiting appeal suggests not that 
parties oppose such agreements, but rather that parties do not believe that 
courts would enforce such agreements. 
Why would agreements not to appeal be unenforceable? Why would 
it be so outlandish to enforce a pre-dispute contract term—even an 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms 
Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 492 (2013). 
 98. Id. at 492–93, 493 n.109. 
 99. See Burke v. Burke, 662 S.E.2d 622, 623, 627 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Paulson, supra note 
97, at 493 n.108. The agreement in Burke was a property settlement agreement, in anticipation of 
divorce, between spouses who had already separated. Burke, 662 S.E.2d at 623. The wife’s lawyer 
drafted the agreement, and the husband was himself a lawyer. Id. While the Virginia Court of 
Appeals enforced the agreement’s prohibition on appeal, this does not suggest it would have 
enforced such a prohibition in a truly pre-dispute agreement, let alone an adhesive pre-dispute 
agreement. See id. at 627. The Burke agreement was post-dispute in the sense that the parties had 
decided to divorce and the agreement—as the name property settlement agreement suggests—
was more in the nature of a settlement agreement and received the high level of consent typically 
received by settlement agreements. See id. at 623. It was not formed until examined by a lawyer 
for each side. Id. 
 100. Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 710 
(2001) (“[A]rbitration does not ordinarily provide a right to appeal. Although parties could, by 
contract, agree to an appellate arbitral tribunal, such agreements are exceedingly rare.”). 
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adhesive contract term—prohibiting appeal? After all, what is really so 
important about appellate review? The primary purpose of appellate 
review relates to law rather than facts. Trial courts find facts and apply 
law to those facts.101 The primary purpose of appellate review is to ensure 
that the trial court correctly applied the law to whatever facts the trial 
court found, as opposed to policing the accuracy of the trial court’s fact-
finding, which is merely a secondary purpose of appellate review.102 
While appellate courts usually give significant deference to trial courts’ 
factual findings, reversing only those that are “clearly erroneous,” 
appellate courts give no deference to trial courts’ legal rulings and thus 
give rulings of law de novo review.103 So the typical appeal of a trial 
court’s decision centers on the appellant’s argument that the trial court 
made an error of law.104  
                                                                                                                     
 101. Martha S. Davis & Stevan Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals: 
Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 536 n.393 (1986) (“[T]he trial court’s 
function is application of law to fact.”). 
 102. Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1109, 1141 (2012) (“The near-exclusive focus on legal issues at the 
appellate level suggests that the legal system of the United States primarily values appellate 
review for its role in lawmaking. . . . [The system] devote[s] fewer appellate resources to this 
review for factual errors.” (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND 
ITS STUDY 36 (1930))); Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 683, 707 (2013) (“Error correction is the other traditional function of appeals courts. 
Generally, in American courts, the error-correction function is limited to issues of law, and trial 
court decisions of fact are rarely reviewed.” (citing McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 
(1954)). 
 103. Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical 
Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–8 (“The decisions in the first category—questions of law—are 
reviewed ‘de novo’ by the appellate court, meaning that the appellate court is not required or 
expected to give any deference to the trial court. . . . In contrast to legal conclusions, factual 
determinations by the trial court are reviewed deferentially. Appellate review of factual findings 
by the district court is limited to whether those findings are ‘clearly erroneous,’ a very high bar to 
reverse a trial judge's factual findings.” (footnotes omitted)); David Frisch, Contractual Choice 
of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 77 (2003) 
(“Traditionally, questions of law are reviewed de novo and questions of fact are reviewable only 
on a clearly erroneous basis.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1831 (2013) (“Appellate courts review questions of law de 
novo . . . . In contrast, appellate courts defer to trial court fact-finding . . . .” (citing J. ERIC 
SMITHBURN, APPELLATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISIONS 8 (2009))); Leandra Lederman, 
(Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1833, 1886 (2014) (“Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) governs the standard of review of findings of fact in district court bench 
trials; Rule 52(a)(6) states that ‘[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.’ The standard of review on legal issues 
appealed from the district courts is de novo.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 104. Anderson, supra note 103, at 8 (“The key point is that the standard of review constrains 
the appellate court to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, meaning that the appeal is primarily 
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Therefore, a contract clause prohibiting appeal would effectively trade 
away the right to correct legally erroneous trial court decisions. Trial 
courts sometimes make errors of law, and when that occurs a contract 
clause prohibiting appeal would be the parties’ consent to enforcement of 
that legally erroneous decision. Enforcing such a clause in a contract 
formed pre-dispute is, as noted above, virtually unheard of, and the notion 
of enforcing such a clause in an adhesion contract is even more 
outlandish. 
By contrast, courts routinely enforce such clauses in adhesive 
arbitration agreements. That is, courts routinely enforce adhesive 
arbitration agreements that trade away the right to correct legally 
erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator, the arbitrator. In fact, most 
every arbitration agreement does this. Most every arbitration agreement 
trades away the right to correct legally erroneous decisions by the initial 
adjudicator, as there is generally no right to correct legally erroneous 
arbitration awards. As noted above, appellate panels of arbitrators are 
very rare.105 And while trial courts’ legal rulings receive de novo review 
from appellate courts,106 arbitrators’ legal rulings almost never receive de 
novo review from courts and usually receive no review at all.107 As the 
Supreme Court acknowledges, arbitration’s “absence of multilayered 
review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”108 Courts 
occasionally vacate an award on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded the law, but “manifest disregard” requires much more than 
an error of law—it requires proof the arbitrator knew the law and chose 
                                                                                                                     
an appeal of legal issues, not a new trial of the whole case.”); Déirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil 
and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 387 (2007) (“Appeal is usually 
on the basis of error of law rather than fact.”); Peter J. Kocoras, The Proper Appellate Standard 
of Review for Probable Cause to Issue a Search Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1993) 
(“At the time of the appeal, the factual record has been constructed by the district court and settled 
for purposes of appellate review, enabling appellate judges to ‘devote their primary attention to 
legal issues.’” (footnote omitted)); Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Evaluating Appeals by the 
Numbers, 66 TEX. B.J. 768, 770 (2003) (“In appeals following jury trials, the most valid 
generalization is that issues of law succeed, and issues of fact and challenges to trial procedure do 
not. An appeal is strongest when the alleged errors are errors of law, and it is generally good 
strategy to emphasize those issues in the brief.”); Ten Cate, supra note 102. 
 105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.  
 106. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 108. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011); see also Bowles Fin. 
Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Arbitration provides 
neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper application of substantive law 
offered by the judicial system.”). 
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to ignore it109—so vacatur on this ground is “extremely rare.”110  
Even when arbitration agreements say courts shall provide de novo 
review of the arbitrator’s legal rulings, courts nevertheless should refuse 
to provide de novo review, according to the Supreme Court’s 2008 
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.111 The Hall Street 
Court refused to enforce a post-dispute arbitration agreement providing 
that 
‘[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon 
may enter judgment upon any award, either by confirming 
the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. 
The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) 
where the arbitrator’s findings of facts are not supported by 
substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s 
conclusions of law are erroneous.’112 
                                                                                                                     
 109. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall 
Street Associates, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 593, 604 (2013) (“Most courts agree that 
manifest disregard applies only in exceptional circumstances; it does not refer to mere error by 
arbitrators on the law or questionable arbitrator interpretations of the contract. The classical 
formulation is that it pertains to a situation in which the arbitrators describe the applicable law 
cogently and knowledgeably and then deliberately ignore it in reaching their determination.” 
(footnote omitted)). The manifest-disregard doctrine applies “when the arbitrators ‘knew the law 
and explicitly disregarded it.’ This is the predominant definition of the manifest disregard 
standard.” Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error: Replacing “Manifest Disregard” With a New 
Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 95 (2012) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x. 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009)). The Supreme 
Court’s Hall Street decision “brought into question whether the . . . Court, by implication, 
abolished the manifest disregard standard. The Court, however, did not decide this issue.” Id. at 
91. “While several of the circuits uphold the use of the manifest disregard doctrine, each of these 
circuits has a slightly different definition for manifest disregard, and all of these interpretations 
seem a bit narrower than the interpretations that existed before Hall Street.” Weathers P. Bolt, 
Note, Much Ado About Nothing: The Effect of Manifest Disregard on Arbitration Agreement 
Decisions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 161, 167 (2011).  
 110. S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and 
U.S. Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 189–90 (2012) (“It is 
extremely rare for a party to establish a manifest disregard of law . . . . As a practical matter, 
claims of manifest disregard of law very seldom result in the setting aside of an award.”); see 
Bolt, supra note 109, at 174 (“[M]anifest disregard is the most common ground for appeal of an 
arbitral ruling, yet it is remarkably unsuccessful.”); Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal 
Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 
164 (2013) (“[M]anifest-disregard review is effectively a dead letter, whether one is in state or 
federal court.”); Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the 
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 16 (2014) (“The [manifest disregard] standard has 
been described . . . as a ‘virtually insurmountable’ hurdle, and even courts recognize the limited 
utility of the doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 
 111. 552 U.S. 576, 584–85 (2008).  
 112. Id. at 579 (alteration in original). 
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The Supreme Court decided against enforcing such agreements, 
which the Court characterized as attempts to expand the grounds for 
vacatur beyond those listed in the Federal Arbitration Act.113 The Hall 
Street Court stated that the FAA’s four grounds for vacatur are 
“exclusive,” so courts should not enforce contractually created grounds 
for vacatur.114 The Court viewed the FAA’s provisions on confirmation 
and vacatur of arbitration awards “as substantiating a national policy 
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain 
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”115 Any 
other reading of the FAA, Hall Street said, “opens the door to the full-
bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can ‘rende[r] informal arbitration 
merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial 
review process,’ and bring arbitration theory to grief in postarbitration 
process.”116 
While refusal to enforce agreements providing for judicial vacatur of 
legally erroneous arbitration awards is yet another problematic117 
arbitration ruling by the post-2006 Supreme Court, especially its 
conservative Justices,118 the broader reluctance of courts to engage in 
close review of arbitrators’ legal rulings is longstanding. For well over a 
century, courts have reviewed arbitration awards very deferentially and 
thus have confirmed and enforced, rather than vacated, most of them, 
including awards in which the arbitrator may have made an error of 
law.119 Before the FAA, the general rule for judicial review of arbitration 
awards was: “If the award is within the [arbitration agreement], and 
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing 
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law 
or fact.”120 On this point of law, little has changed, as the FAA’s grounds 
                                                                                                                     
 113. Id. at 586–87. 
 114. Id. at 582 & n.4, 584. 
 115. Id. at 588. 
 116. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-
Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 117. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & 
MEDIATION 56, 92–96 (2014). 
 118. Hall Street had five Republican appointees in the majority (Scalia, Roberts, Souter, 
Thomas, Alito) and only one Democratic appointee (Ginsburg). Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578.  
 119. Ware, supra note 117, at 69. 
 120. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854); see also In re Curtis, 30 A. 769, 772 (Conn. 
1894) (ruling that courts refuse to set aside an arbitration award “except for partiality and 
corruption in the arbitrators, mistakes on their own principles, or fraud or misbehavior in the 
parties”); Sherfy v. Graham, 72 Ill. 158, 159–60 (1874) (stating that arbitrators, “by the 
submission, become judges, by the choice of the parties, both of the law and the fact, and from 
their decision there is no appeal or review, of any decision made by them within the scope of their 
powers, unless it be for fraud, partiality or misconduct.”); Pulliam v. Pensoneau, 33 Ill. 374, 378 
 
1254 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
for vacating awards are narrow and do not include “error of law” by the 
arbitrator.121 With Hall Street holding that the FAA’s grounds for vacatur 
are “exclusive,”122 there is every reason to believe that courts will 
continue to confirm arbitration awards without determining whether they 
correctly apply the law or rest on errors of law.123  
In effect then, an arbitration agreement trades away the right to correct 
legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator (the arbitrator).124 
Current law routinely enforces such agreements, even when they are part 
of adhesion contracts.125 In this respect, current law enforces adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than it enforces other adhesion 
contracts.126 Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements, but 
not other adhesion contracts, that purport to trade away the right to correct 
legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator.127  
If the arbitrator’s error of law resulted in the arbitration award denying 
a claim that would have prevailed under a correct decision of law, then 
the arbitration agreement had the effect of negating that claim. In that 
situation, a claim that would have won, but for a pre-dispute contract 
clause, in fact loses because that clause is enforced. Thus, the arbitration 
clause had the same effect as an enforceable exculpatory clause—a pre-
dispute contract clause negating a claim that might later occur. However, 
exculpatory clauses are generally not enforced with respect to most 
claims arising out of tort or statutory law.128 In particular, courts are 
especially unlikely to enforce exculpatory clauses to negate claims 
arising out of areas of law (such as consumer, employment, labor, 
                                                                                                                     
(1864) (stating that the decision of the arbitrator is conclusive on the parties, and a mistake in 
either law or fact is not usually corrected). 
 121. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (omitting “error of law” from listed grounds for vacatur); Jay E. 
Grenig, After the Arbitration Award: Not Always Final and Binding, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
65, 99 (2014) (“Review of an arbitration award is limited. A court may vacate an arbitrator’s 
decision only in very unusual circumstances.”); Benjamin A. Griffith, Comment, Contractual 
Expansion of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards in Missouri After Hall Street and Cable 
Connection, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 265, 277 (2013) (“Congress established narrow grounds for 
judicial review of arbitration awards under § 10 of the FAA. The language of § 10 has been 
interpreted to not allow review of arbitral awards for errors of law or fact. As a result, if the arbitral 
award does not violate one of the four provisions of § 10, the reviewing court is required by the 
FAA to confirm it.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 122. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584. 
 123. Ware, supra note 117, at 92–96. 
 124. Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 201 (“By contracting 
to arbitrate, parties are essentially contracting out of the right to appeal.”). 
 125. See discussion supra Subsections I.B.1, I.C.1.  
 126. See Ware, supra note 2, at 751. 
 127. Id. at 746–48. An arbitration agreement basically consents to enforcement of the 
arbitrator’s legally erroneous decisions. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text.  
 128. Ware, supra note 2, at 728.  
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securities, and franchise law) designed to override contract terms 
(“mandatory-law claims”).129  
With respect to mandatory-law claims, current arbitration law is 
anomalous. Combining enforcement of adhesive agreements to arbitrate 
statutory and other mandatory-law claims with judicial review that is too 
deferential to identify and vacate legally erroneous arbitration awards 
results in enforcement of adhesion contracts to negate claims that could 
not be negated directly with exculpatory clauses because courts would 
not enforce them. In this important and controversial respect, arbitration 
law enforces adhesion contracts more broadly than other law does. 
Arbitration law enforces effectively exculpatory clauses when other law 
would not enforce an exculpatory clause. Thus, arbitration law has a 
lower standard of consent than other law because, while other law 
requires post-dispute consent (a settlement agreement130) to negate a 
mandatory-law claim, arbitration law tolerates pre-dispute consent, even 
adhesive consent, to negate a mandatory-law claim.  
While enforcing contracts trading away purportedly mandatory-law 
claims, and thus transforming those ostensibly mandatory rules into 
default rules,131 appeals to my general preference for default rather than 
mandatory law, I nevertheless believe those of us who are against 
mandatory law should seek to repeal it directly.132 To be consistent with 
non-arbitration law generally, arbitration law must stop allowing pre-
dispute arbitration clauses to have the effect of enforceable exculpatory 
clauses in circumstances in which non-arbitration exculpatory clauses 
would be unenforceable. If mandatory laws are to be repealed, that should 
be accomplished by the legislatures that enacted them, not by adhesive 
arbitration agreements.  
2.  The Anomaly Only Exists with Respect to Mandatory-Law Claims 
Arising out of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements 
(Settlement Agreements vs. Exculpatory Clauses) 
The anomaly of current law enforcing adhesive arbitration 
agreements, but not other adhesion contracts that trade away the right to 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through 
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1999). 
 132. Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in 
EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION 
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 117 n.93 (2006) (“As an aside, I feel compelled 
to add that I oppose much of the mandatory law enacted since the FAA so I am sort of pleased 
that arbitration now allows parties to opt out of such law. But I believe candor and logical 
consistency require those of us who oppose mandatory law to seek to repeal it outright, not to use 
arbitration to make an end run around it.”). 
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correct legally erroneous decisions by the initial adjudicator, is an 
anomaly only with respect to legally erroneous decisions on questions of 
mandatory (as opposed to default) rules of law.  
As noted above, a default rule is a legal rule that governs in the 
absence of an enforceable contract term to the contrary.133 For example, 
in a sale of goods under the UCC, the default rule is that the seller’s place 
of business is the place for delivery of the goods, but the parties can opt 
out of that default with a contract term requiring delivery at some other 
location.134 If the parties’ contract does not specify a place for delivery 
but has an arbitration clause, then the contract allows the arbitrator to 
determine the place for delivery. If the arbitrator does not correctly apply 
the UCC and concludes the place of delivery is somewhere other than the 
seller’s place of business, the arbitrator has made a legally erroneous 
ruling, but one to which the parties should be held because the parties’ 
contract delegated their lawmaking discretion over default rules to their 
agent, the arbitrator.135 Just as the parties would be held to a pre-dispute 
contract term in which they expressly chose someplace other than the 
seller’s place as their place for delivery, they should be held to a pre-
dispute contract term giving their arbitrator the power to choose 
someplace other than the seller’s place as their place for delivery, even if 
the arbitrator exercised that power by making an error of law.136  
In contrast, if the arbitrator erroneously decides an issue of mandatory 
law then the parties should not be held to the arbitrator’s decision, even 
if the parties’ pre-dispute contract (including the arbitration clause) 
authorized and supported that decision. Many statutes and regulations in 
consumer, employment, and other areas of law prohibit enforcement of 
various contract terms.137 In other words, these laws restrict freedom of 
contract. They prohibit parties from producing certain results by contract. 
For example, if the relevant statute prohibits interest rates above 24%, 
then the parties may not lawfully contract for 36% interest.138 But 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law, 
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 733 (1993).  
 134. U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 135. See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (“In 
the main, an arbitrator acts as the parties’ agent and as their delegate may do anything the parties 
may do directly.”). 
 136. This freedom to make privatized default law allows parties to develop legal rules 
different from, and perhaps better than, the government rules of law they are exiting.  
 137. Ware, supra note 2, at 716–17. 
 138. See Beltz v. Dings, 6 P.3d 424, 430 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to enforce a contract 
for a deed between two individuals with a 1% interest rate per month because it exceeded the 
state’s allowable maximum annual rate of 10.33%); NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, 
LLC, 84 A.3d 800, 806 (R.I. 2014) (refusing to enforce a contract with 23.17% interest rate 
because Rhode Island’s usury statute prohibits rates above 21%).  
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suppose their contract does require 36% interest and an arbitration award 
enforces that requirement. The arbitrator has erred on an issue of 
mandatory law. If a trial court made that error of law, then an appellate 
court would presumably reverse the trial court’s judgment to correct the 
error. Further, as noted above, an adhesion contract purporting to trade 
away the right to correct the legally erroneous trial court decision would 
be unenforceable.139 Similarly, an adhesive arbitration agreement should 
be unenforceable to the extent it would prevent courts from correcting the 
arbitrator’s error of enforcing a 36% interest rate, or any other arbitrator 
errors on questions of mandatory law.  
This anomaly of enforcing adhesive arbitration agreements, but not 
other adhesion contracts trading away the right to correct legally 
erroneous decisions on mandatory law, was not a significant issue before 
the 1980s, because courts of that era generally did not enforce pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under mandatory law. Courts 
largely limited pre-1980s arbitration to disputes governed by the default 
rules of contract and commercial law.140 A pre-1980s arbitration award 
on a mandatory-law claim was apparently pretty rare and would generally 
only occur as a result of a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.  
Distinguishing between pre- and post-dispute agreements regarding 
mandatory law is crucial. While, as noted above, a pre-dispute agreement 
negating a mandatory law claim is an exculpatory clause, a post-dispute 
agreement negating a mandatory law claim is a settlement agreement. 
Courts routinely enforce settlement agreements to negate mandatory-law 
claims—even unsophisticated or vulnerable parties’ settlement 
agreements to negate mandatory-law claims—outside the arbitration law 
context.141 Courts enforce “legally erroneous” settlement agreements by 
routinely enforcing settlement agreements without asking whether their 
terms are similar to the result a court would have reached had the case 
not settled.142 As post-dispute arbitration agreements are a type of 
settlement agreement, by enforcing legally erroneous arbitration awards 
arising out of post-dispute arbitration agreements, pre-1980s law 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.1. 
 140. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646 
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this era, arbitration was used “almost entirely in either the area 
of labor disputes or in ‘ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact.’” Id. at 650 
(quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. 
REV. 265, 281 (1926)). Arbitrators in these two contexts hear almost nothing but breach-of-
contract claims. In the labor context, a union or employee asserts breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement. In the commercial context, merchants allege breach of contracts for the sale of goods 
and raise “questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of 
payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like.” Id. at 646 n.11. 
 141. Ware, supra note 2, at 727–29. 
 142. Ware, supra note 117, at 64–66. 
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enforced arbitration agreements and non-arbitration agreements similarly 
with respect to post-dispute agreements to resolve a dispute on terms 
quite different from those a court would have chosen.143  
Pre-1980s law was also generally consistent across arbitration and 
non-arbitration agreements in not enforcing pre-dispute agreements, let 
alone adhesive agreements, trading away the right to appeal legally 
erroneous decisions on mandatory law.144 This changed from 1985 to 
1991, when the Supreme Court decided cases in which it enforced pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate several important mandatory-law claims 
(antitrust, securities, and employment discrimination),145 but retained 
deferential judicial review of arbitration awards, even those involving 
mandatory-law claims. This created the anomaly of enforcing pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements—even adhesive pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements—trading away the right to appeal legally erroneous decisions 
on mandatory law, while denying enforcement of pre-dispute non-
arbitration agreements trading away the right to appeal legally erroneous 
decisions on mandatory law. This anomaly should be fixed for the sake 
of the law’s internal coherence,146 regardless of one’s beliefs about the 
frequency with which arbitrators make legally erroneous decisions on 
mandatory law.147 
One way to fix this anomaly would be to reverse or override the 
Court’s 1985–1991 decisions enforcing pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate mandatory-law claims. This “turn back the clock” approach is 
part of the Very Progressive Position, which would not enforce pre-
dispute arbitration agreements by individuals.148 This approach is 
overbroad because it would deny individuals the freedom to form 
enforceable pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under 
default rules of law, and because even individuals’ pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under mandatory rules of law 
                                                                                                                     
 143. See id. at 58. 
 144. See id.  
 145. The important cases were: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 
(1987) (Securities Exchange Act and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 
(1991) (employment discrimination). Their predecessor was Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506 (1974), but it stood alone for over a decade and seemed narrowly confined to the special 
concerns of international cases. 
 146. See Ware, supra note 132, at 117. 
 147. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 194 
(2006) (“‘[H]ow often’ do arbitrators not follow the law? The empirical evidence on this point—
which consists of case analyses, surveys of arbitrators, and reversal rates of arbitration awards 
and court decisions—is varied but ultimately inconclusive.” (footnote omitted)). 
 148. Ware, supra note 2, at 733–34. 
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should be enforced so long as arbitrators’ rulings on mandatory law are 
adequately policed by judicial review. 
Rather than the Very Progressive Position’s overbroad approach of 
returning to pre-1980s law, a better tailored (and more centrist) way to fix 
the anomaly of uncorrected, legally erroneous decisions on mandatory 
law is to start correcting them. Courts could give de novo review to 
arbitrators’ decisions on questions of mandatory law. I have long 
supported this149 and propose the following law reform, whether enacted 
by Congress, the CFPB, or perhaps the Supreme Court150: 
In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration 
awards, a state or federal court shall vacate an award arising 
out of an agreement providing for arbitration of any future 
dispute between the parties where the award was based on 
the arbitrators’ error of law and, at the time of their most 
recent agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration, 
the parties could not have formed an enforceable contract to 
avoid such law.151 
The final clause—“at the time of their most recent agreement 
submitting the controversy to arbitration, the parties could not have 
formed an enforceable contract to avoid such law”152—ensures that only 
awards arising out of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate would be subject 
to de novo review, and ensures that de novo review would apply only to 
questions of mandatory, not default, law. This rule would fix the anomaly 
of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even adhesive arbitration 
agreements, but not other pre-dispute contracts trading away the right to 
appeal legally erroneous decisions. This rule would make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other agreements, but not more so. 
D.  Enforce Arbitral Class Waivers No More or Less Than Non-Arbitral 
Class Waivers 
In addition to contract defenses (the separability doctrine) and 
vacating legally erroneous decisions on mandatory law, the third 
important and controversial topic on which current law enforces adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts is 
“class waivers;” that is, contract terms trading away (not technically 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Ware, supra note 131, at 727. 
 150. This centrist proposal might be the best resolution of tension between the FAA and at 
least federal law creating mandatory-law rights, i.e., rights purportedly inalienable pre-dispute. 
 151. Ware, supra note 2, at 752. 
 152. Id.  
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“waiving”153) the right to be part of a class action. This Section first 
analyzes the law governing class waivers and then suggests that 
arbitration law should refrain from taking a side in the ongoing policy 
battles over class actions. 
1.  Class Waivers and the Black-Letter Law of Concepcion and Amex 
The following Sections analyze the black-letter law governing class 
waivers by discussing the two important cases in which the Supreme 
Court made this law. The first deals with arbitration law’s relationship 
to state law, while the second deals with arbitration law’s relationship to 
federal law. 
a.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Before 2011, courts were split on the enforceability of class waivers 
in arbitration agreements (“arbitral class waivers”). Some courts enforced 
them to preclude both litigation and classwide arbitration, thus leaving 
only individual arbitration to resolve claims covered by an arbitration 
agreement with a class waiver.154 In contrast, other courts refused, often 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual 
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 205 (2004). 
One can alienate one’s rights in two ways: in exchange for consideration or in 
the absence of consideration. To put it another way, one can trade away one’s 
rights, or one can give away one’s rights. In some legal contexts, such as contract 
law, the term “waiver” is often used to refer only to giving away one’s rights. 
Standard accounts of contract law, for example, carefully distinguish the 
“waiver” of contractual rights, which does not require consideration, from the 
“modification” of contractual rights, which does.  
Id. at 169 n.16. For this reason, “class waiver” is a misleading term to the extent “waiver” implies 
alienating a right for nothing in return; if the alienating occurs through a contract term, then it is 
better understood as a trade than a waiver. 
 154. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877–78 (11th 
Cir. 2005); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. 
Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 
225 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); Borrero v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. CIV S-10-322 KJM, 2010 
WL 4054114, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2129 
ADM/JJG, 2010 WL 3702592, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 13, 2010), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
653 F.3d 766 (2011); Johnson v. Carmax, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-213, 2010 WL 2802478, at *3–4 
(E.D. Va. July 14, 2010); Jackson v. Payday Loan Store of Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 4189, 2010 WL 
1031590, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010); Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-
918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008); Deaton v. Overstock.com, Inc., 
No. 07-cv-643-JPG, 2007 WL 4569874, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2007); Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. 
Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); Maiorano v. Prof’l Cmty. Mgmt., Inc., No. B220127, 2010 
WL 3786721, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 
P.3d 1249, 1253–54 (Colo. App. 2001); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1260–61 
(Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 750 (Md. 2005); Gras v. 
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on unconscionability grounds, to enforce many arbitral class waivers.155 
For instance, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,156 the California 
Supreme Court said: 
We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily 
unconscionable. But when the waiver is found in a consumer 
contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between 
the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of 
damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent 
the obligation at issue is governed by California law, the 
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from 
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the 
person or property of another.” Under these circumstances, 
such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced.157 
The California Supreme Court’s quote from a California statute 
prohibiting exculpatory clauses is telling. The strongest argument against 
class waivers is that they are often effectively exculpatory clauses. This 
                                                                                                                     
Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Ranieri v. Bell 
Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 
693 N.W.2d 918, 926 (N.D. 2005); Autonation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 202 (Tex. 
App. 2003); Bandler v. Charter One Bank, No. 451-7-03 Rdcv, 2010 WL 3617115, 11–12 (Super. 
Ct. Vt. 2010), rev’d, 59 A.3d 157 (Vt. 2012); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-105(1) (West 
2015) (stating that “a creditor may contract with the debtor of an open-end consumer credit 
contract for a waiver by the debtor of the right to initiate or participate in a class action related to 
the open-end consumer credit contract”). 
 155. See, e.g., Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2010); Dale v. 
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 
1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Jones v. 
DirecTV, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 
229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 
(Ala. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815–16 (Ct. App. 2006), 
abrogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333; Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 243 (Ct. 
App. 2005); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kinkel v. 
Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, 
Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 
Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006), superseded by statute, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012), as recognized in 
Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191 (2012); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 
859, 866–67 (Ohio 1998); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 283 (W. Va. 2002).  
 156. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 157. Id. at 87 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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argument can be made as a matter of doctrine (class waivers are 
unenforceable when they have exculpatory effect) or as a matter of policy 
(class waivers should be unenforceable when they have exculpatory 
effect).  
The Supreme Court rejected the doctrinal version of this argument in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.158 The Concepcion decision held that 
the just-quoted “Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”159 
Concepcion involved a federal court’s application of the Discover Bank 
rule to hold unconscionable an arbitration clause in a consumer’s cell-
phone contract.160 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that the FAA did not preempt the Discover Bank rule, because that rule 
was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to 
contracts generally in California”161 and thus fell within the savings 
clause at the end of FAA § 2, which states that arbitration agreements 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”162  
The Supreme Court’s majority, consisting entirely of Republican-
appointed Justices, disagreed.163 It said, “The overarching purpose of the 
FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”164 The Court’s reasoning relied on the premise 
that an important purpose of the FAA was to enforce agreements in which 
parties choose the more streamlined process (arbitration) over the more 
elaborate process (litigation). Concepcion suggested that the FAA would 
preempt (hypothetical) state law deeming unconscionable arbitration 
agreements lacking “judicially monitored discovery,”165 “adherence to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence,”166 or “arbitration-by-jury”167 because 
requiring arbitration to include these aspects of litigation would 
effectively convert the more streamlined process into the more elaborate 
process. Thus, it would no longer be “arbitration,” as those who enacted 
                                                                                                                     
 158. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 159. Id. at 352. 
 160. Id. at 336–38.  
 161. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Shroyer v. 
New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 162. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 163. Four Justices joined the opinion, with Justice Clarence Thomas concurring in the result 
and expressing a view to the Right of the other four Republican appointees. See Concepcion, 563 
U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that FAA § 2 “does not include all defenses 
applicable to any contract but rather some subset of those defenses”). 
 164. Id. at 344. 
 165. Id.   
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 349 n.7. 
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the FAA envisioned that process.168 Similarly, the Court said, “Requiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the 
FAA.”169  
In all this, Concepcion built on an earlier anti-class-arbitration 
decision, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,170 which 
also had a majority consisting entirely of the Court’s five Republican-
appointees.171 Quoting Stolt, the Concepcion Court said: 
“[C]hanges brought about by the shift from bilateral 
arbitration to class-action arbitration” are 
“fundamental.” . . . The conclusion follows that class 
arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank 
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA. 
First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices 
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment. . . . 
Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. The 
[American Arbitration Association’s] rules governing class 
arbitrations mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
class litigation. . . .  
. . . [I]t is at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator 
would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due 
process rights are satisfied.  
Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. 
Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence 
of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will 
go uncorrected. . . . 
. . . We find it hard to believe that defendants would bet the 
company with no effective means of review, and even harder 
to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state 
courts to force such a decision.172 
                                                                                                                     
 168. The Concepcion Court said that “[p]arties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process rivaling that in litigation. 
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations. But 
what the parties in the aforementioned examples would have agreed to is not arbitration as 
envisioned by the FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state law.” Id. at 
351 (citation omitted). 
 169. Id. at 344. 
 170. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 171. Id. at 665.  
 172. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347–51 (citation omitted) (quoting Stolt, 559 U.S. at 686).  
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In sum, the conservative Justices comprising the majorities in Stolt 
and Concepcion see “bilateral” arbitration—the simple type of arbitration 
contemplated by the FAA—as the norm and see class arbitration as a 
strange process that a few parties might choose, but which should not be 
imposed on parties who have agreed to arbitrate without specifically 
addressing class arbitration. And Concepcion strongly suggests that 
courts may not consider it a strike against the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement that the agreement provides only for arbitration and 
not for class arbitration, even if that has exculpatory effect. Concepcion 
reads the FAA as preempting state law—even state law categorized as 
“unconscionability” or some other ground for the revocation of any 
contract—that “[r]equir[es] the availability of classwide arbitration.”173 
b.  American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
While Concepcion was a case of federal law (the FAA) preempting 
state law that otherwise would have invalidated an adhesive arbitral class 
                                                                                                                     
If procedures are too informal, absent class members would not be bound by the 
arbitration. For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, 
class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class 
members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be 
heard, and a right to opt out of the class. At least this amount of process would 
presumably be required for absent parties to be bound by the results of 
arbitration.  
We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the 
disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator. Indeed, class 
arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 
1925; as the California Supreme Court admitted in Discover Bank, class 
arbitration is a “relatively recent development.”  
Id. at 349 (citations omitted). 
 173. Id. at 344; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). Shortly after Concepcion, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of 
lower courts that had found arbitration agreement class waivers unconscionable and had then 
permitted class litigation. See Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 
2010) (concluding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that, under Stolt, the 
court could not force class arbitration when the arbitration agreement was silent), vacated sub 
nom. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 564 U.S. 1001 (2011); Brewer v. Mo. Title 
Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 24 (Mo. 2010) (striking a consumer title loan class arbitration waiver 
and the arbitration agreement requiring arbitration on an individual basis, leaving the consumer 
with the option of bringing a class action in court), vacated, 563 U.S. 971 (2011). For post-
Concepcion cases, see Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599, 606 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Concepcion] 
prohibited courts from altering otherwise valid arbitration agreements by applying the doctrine of 
unconscionability to eliminate a term barring classwide procedures.”); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 
F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the FAA preempts Washington state law invalidating 
class-action waivers as substantively unconscionable). 
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waiver, the 2013 case of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant174 was the FAA trumping other federal law that would have 
invalidated an adhesive arbitral class waiver. Plaintiffs in Amex brought 
antitrust class litigation despite an arbitral class waiver in their 
agreements with the defendant.175 While the district court dismissed the 
suits and ordered individual arbitrations, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed, based in part on a declaration from an 
economist who estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to 
prove the antitrust claims would be “‘at least several hundred thousand 
dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for 
an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.”176 
The Second Circuit stated that because “the class action waiver in this 
case precludes plaintiffs from enforcing their statutory rights, we find the 
arbitration provision unenforceable.”177  
In short, the Second Circuit held that the class waiver was effectively 
an exculpatory clause and for that reason should not be enforced. Unlike 
the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank, the Second Circuit in 
Amex did not point to a statute prohibiting exculpatory clauses. However, 
the doctrine on which the Second Circuit relied—the judicially created 
doctrine invalidating arbitration clauses that prevent effective vindication 
of federal statutory rights—is substantively similar.178 While this 
“effective vindication” doctrine invalidating arbitration clauses with 
exculpatory effect shares much in common with the unconscionability 
doctrine, it is distinct because it is based not on state law but rather on the 
fact that federal antitrust law is weakened by enforcement of arbitral class 
waivers.179 In other words, the Second Circuit perceived tension among 
federal statutes and resolved that tension in favor of the antitrust statutes 
(the Sherman and Clayton Acts) and against the FAA. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s now-familiar five-Justice 
conservative majority resolved this tension in favor of the FAA and 
against the antitrust statutes. In reversing the Second Circuit’s decision, 
the Supreme Court in Amex said:  
[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving 
a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the 
right to pursue that remedy. The class-action waiver merely 
limits arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more 
eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory 
                                                                                                                     
 174. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 175. Id. at 2308. 
 176. Id. 
 177. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 178. See WARE, supra note 6, at 76. 
 179. Id. at 76–77. 
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remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class 
action for legal relief in 1938. Or, to put it differently, the 
individual suit that was considered adequate to assure 
“effective vindication” of a federal right before adoption of 
class-action procedures did not suddenly become 
“ineffective vindication” upon their adoption.180 
In this passage, the Supreme Court does not dispute that the class 
waiver was effectively an exculpatory clause. And as a matter of doctrine 
(as distinguished from policy) Amex makes a plausible, perhaps even 
strong, argument for enforcing the class waiver despite its exculpatory 
effect. In sum, Concepcion and Amex indicate that courts will generally 
enforce even exculpatory adhesive arbitral class waivers until a statute, 
regulation, or new Supreme Court majority tells them not to. 
2.  Arbitration Law Should Not Be a Combatant in the “Holy War” over 
Class Actions 
Before Concepcion and Amex, courts rarely enforced class waivers in 
non-arbitration adhesion contracts (“non-arbitral class waivers”).181 
Concepcion and Amex made adhesive arbitration agreements more 
enforceable than other adhesion contracts with respect to class waivers.182 
                                                                                                                     
 180. American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 181. Compare Martrano v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 08-0932, 2009 WL 1704469, at *21 
(W.D. Pa. June 15, 2009) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), In re Yahoo! Litig., 251 
F.R.D. 459, 469–70 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing to hold a non-arbitral class waiver enforceable as 
a matter of law in a commercial case and denying a motion for summary judgment pending “more 
developed evidentiary record”), Elhilu v. Quizno’s Franchising Co., No. 2:06-cv-07855-FMC-
CTx, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109435, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008) (invalidating a non-arbitral 
class waiver), and Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., No. 
06–cv–02358-CMA-KLM, 2009 WL 1068744, at *22 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (enforcing a non-
arbitral class waiver).  
Some courts did enforce forum-selection clauses choosing a forum that did not permit class 
actions. See, e.g., Koch v. Am. Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (D. Md. 2000) (concluding 
that the unavailability of class actions in Virginia is an insufficient reason to refuse to enforce 
Virginia forum-selection clause); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C. 
2002); Am. Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); 
Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 692 A.2d 454, 464–65 (Md. 1997). 
 182. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use 
of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 964 (2014) (“Unlike 
arbitral class waivers, nonarbitral class waivers likely remain subject to state unconscionability 
challenges.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-
Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 389 
(2011) (“The [Concepcion] Court majority could . . . [have struck] down the arbitration provision 
[with its class waiver], paving the way for a class action in court. Had there been a class-action 
waiver without the arbitration provision, that would presumably have been the result.”); Maureen 
A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 782–84 
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Concepcion and Amex allowed businesses to do with adhesive arbitration 
agreements what other adhesion contracts generally could not do: contain 
enforceable pre-dispute class waivers.  
Since Concepcion and Amex, however, most courts faced with 
adhesive non-arbitral class waivers seem to be enforcing them.183 This 
change suggests the Supreme Court’s enforcement of adhesive arbitral 
class waivers is encouraging courts to enforce non-arbitral class 
waivers—which, before Concepcion and Amex, they would not have. 
This seems to be an example of the tail wagging the dog. Rather than 
arbitration law (the tail) influencing law on class actions, including 
waivers of them (the dog), arbitration law on class waivers should defer 
to non-arbitration law on class waivers.184 If non-arbitration law on class 
actions should be changed, then it should be changed directly (whether 
by case law, statute, or regulation) rather than through arbitration law 
influencing it. 
Class actions have been controversial since they first proliferated in 
the 1970s—a time when Professor Arthur Miller described a “holy war” 
in which one side saw the class action as a knight in shining armor, while 
the other side saw it as a “Frankenstein” monster.185 Not much has 
                                                                                                                     
(2012) (discussing cases upholding class action waivers based on FAA preemption even if state 
law would invalidate such waivers); U.S. Supreme Court Issues Significant New Decision 
Regarding Class Action Litigation, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Apr. 28, 2011), 
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/pdfsearch/wsgralert_cl
ass_action_litigation.htm (“While class waivers outside of arbitration agreements are likely not 
valid in California and many other states, [Concepcion] provides powerful ammunition to 
companies that would prefer to resolve claims through individual arbitration rather than through 
the court system” (footnote omitted)).  
 183. Compare Grant v. Convergys Corp., No. 4:12-CV-496 (CEJ), 2013 WL 781898, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2013) (invalidating a non-arbitral class waiver), with Mazurkiewicz v. Clayton 
Homes, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), 
Birdsong v. AT&T Corp., No. C12–6175 TEH, 2013 WL 1120783, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2013) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), Killion v. KeHE, 885 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882, 885 
(N.D. Ohio 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class waiver), and Palmer v. Convergys Corp., No. 
7:10-cv-145 (HL), 2012 WL 425256, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (enforcing a non-arbitral class 
waiver). 
 184. See supra note 181. 
 185. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and 
the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665 (1979). See also DEBORAH HENSLER ET 
AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 35 (2000) (describing efforts in the 1990s to revise Rule 23, and 
finding that “[a]lthough the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s had brought new ingredients to 
the debate over damage class actions, the thousands of pages of comment and testimony on the 
Advisory Committee’s proposals echo the three decades of controversy that preceded its efforts 
to revise Rule 23”); JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGURD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 531 (1998) (“No other federal rule of civil procedure has generated as much 
debate, or as much division, as Rule 23.”); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New 
Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
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changed throughout several decades of this “holy war,” and this war is 
not likely to end anytime soon. As Professor Deborah Hensler et al.  
explain, whether the benefits of class actions outweigh their costs “is a 
deeply political question, implicating fundamental beliefs about the 
structure of the political system, the nature of society, and the roles of 
courts and law in society. . . . [T]his political question is . . . unlikely to 
be resolved soon.”186  
Those who dislike class actions presumably appreciate Concepcion 
and Amex for enforcing class waivers that likely reduce class actions, 
while defenders of class actions criticize Concepcion and Amex for the 
same reason.187 In short, debate over Concepcion and Amex enforcing 
                                                                                                                     
L. 179, 180 (2001) (describing the debate on class actions, and noting that “[t]oday there is again 
a sense that monsters are loose in the land,” where courts are overrun with class action litigation); 
Edward F. Sherman, Decline & Fall, ABA J., June 2007, at 51, http://www.abajournal.com/mag 
azine/article/decline_fall/ (“The rise and fall of consumer class actions is a cycle that began in 
1966 when the scope of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was expanded to allow 
class action suits for damages. . . . [I]n addition to causing consternation in the business sector, 
the increase in class actions ignited an intense debate over whether the social benefits of class 
actions outweigh their costs.”). 
 186. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 185, at 471–72. 
 187. Some scholars suggest that Concepcion and Amex enable adhesion contracts’ class 
waivers to virtually end consumer (and perhaps employment) class actions. See, e.g., Myriam 
Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-
Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 458–62 
(2014); Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 377 (2005) (arguing that “collective action 
waiver[s]” have the potential to “bar the majority of class actions as we know them”); Ann C. 
Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
1682, 1688 (2014); Marc J. Mandich, Comment, AT&T v. Concepcion: The End of the Modern 
Consumer Class, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 205, 206 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–05, 727 (2012) 
[hereinafter Sternlight, Tsunami] (“Thus, Concepcion has caused a tsunami wave that is 
threatening to eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their substantive 
rights by participating in class actions.”); id. at 725 (“We should not allow companies to shortcut 
the legislative process by using arbitration to abolish class actions.”); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally 
Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2012) [hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory Binding]; 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, SFGATE (Nov. 7, 2010, 
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-could-end-class-action-
suits-3246898.php; Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes Consumers’ Rights in Most Pro-
Corporate Decision Since Citizens United, THINKPROGRESS: JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2011, 3:40 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/04/27/176997/scotus-nukes-consumers/. But see Rutledge 
& Drahozal, supra note 182, at 961 (“Our central finding is consistent across both samples of 
franchise agreements: the predicted tsunami of arbitral class waivers has not occurred.”). Perhaps 
to some extent non-class action alternatives for consumer plaintiffs can or will produce something 
very similar to the class action. See Myriam E. Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based 
Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1220–28 (2012) (discussing 
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class waivers may be little more than a rather predictable application of 
the broader debate about class actions. So the battle over class waivers 
may be as intractable as the broader “holy war” over class actions.188 And 
arbitration law is caught in the crossfire.  
Rather than remain in the crossfire of the battle over class waivers, 
arbitration law should leave the battlefield and be a non-combatant to 
protect itself from further injury. Rather than join the anti-class-action 
army (as Concepcion and Amex arguably did) or join the pro-class-action 
army (as the Arbitration Fairness Act proposes189), arbitration law should 
be neutral on class actions and class waivers. Arbitration law is not the 
body of law that should decide whether class waivers are enforceable.  
That is because arbitration law is not centrally concerned with class 
actions, which are part of the law of civil procedure. Debates over class 
actions are traditionally and appropriately held in the context of proposed 
amendments to the federal and state rules of civil procedure.190 The fact 
that Congress enacted arbitration law’s dominant statute, the FAA, before 
the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,191 which was 
well before the Federal Rules’ 1966 revision of Rule 23 blessing class 
actions, confirms arbitration law’s separateness from these debates.192 
More recently, Congress has continued its practice of enacting statutes 
addressing class actions without addressing arbitration law.193 State 
legislatures have even addressed the enforceability of class waivers: Utah 
permits their enforcement, while California opposes their enforcement.194 
                                                                                                                     
the use of alternative avenues for claimants to seek redress in light of the decline in class action 
remedies); Gilles & Sebok, supra, at 468, 473; David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s 
Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
& REFORM 1151, 1153 (2013). 
 188. See Miller, supra note 185, at 664.  
 189. See H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 190. See, e.g., Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 187, at 720 & n.85. 
 191. See Chandler, supra note 28, at 348, 512; Mandich, supra note 187, at 210. 
 192. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 238 (1987) (describing the 1966 revisions to Rule 23). 
 193. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (limiting, among other things, the 
number of lawsuits an individual can serve as a class representative, establishing rules for the 
appointment of the lead plaintiff, and prohibiting class representatives from receiving special 
compensation); Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (allowing defendants to remove a larger number of 
class action lawsuits to federal court and increasing judicial scrutiny on so-called “coupon 
settlements,” where class members receive a coupon for discounts from the settling defendant). 
 194. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-3-104 (West 2015) (“[A] creditor may contract with 
the debtor of a closed-end consumer contract for a waiver by the debtor of the right to initiate or 
participate in a class action related to the closed-end consumer contract.”), with CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1751 (West 2016) (“Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public 
policy and shall be unenforceable and void.”).  
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Finally, outside of arbitration law, courts have created case law precedent 
by deciding whether to enforce non-arbitral class waivers.195 Thus, we 
have three non-arbitration-law fora—amendments to rules of civil 
procedure, statutes, and case law—in which to make law about class 
actions generally and class waivers specifically. Any or all of these fora 
are better suited to making that law than is arbitration law.  
Accordingly, arbitration law should be agnostic about class waivers 
and should defer to these other bodies of law. This Article’s centrist 
proposal does exactly that. The proposal in the Appendix states that if any 
arbitration “agreement requires claims to be brought on an individual, 
rather than class, basis then such requirement shall be as enforceable as 
such a requirement in a non-arbitration agreement would be under similar 
circumstances.”196 This does not say that arbitral class waivers should or 
should not be enforceable. It says that arbitration law should follow other 
law on the circumstances in which they are enforceable. In short, it says 
arbitration law should defer to other law in deciding whether a class 
waiver is enforceable.  
Of course, if an arbitral class waiver is not enforced the question arises 
whether the dispute will go to class arbitration or class litigation. Class 
arbitration might be bad for the reasons stated in Stolt and Concepcion,197 
such as concern about entrusting an arbitrator “with ensuring that third 
parties’ due process rights are satisfied.”198 For these reasons, courts 
might readily enforce arbitration agreements saying that if the class 
waiver is unenforceable then the arbitration clause is cancelled, so the 
parties will litigate rather than arbitrate.199 In fact, after striking down 
class waivers, courts might even send parties to class litigation rather than 
class arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement specifically says that if 
the court invalidates the class waiver, the rest of the arbitration agreement 
survives. In sum, striking down arbitral class waivers does not have to 
yield much, if any, class arbitration. Arbitration law can retreat to the 
sidelines of the class action wars, by adopting a neutral position on class 
waivers, without producing whatever practical problems class arbitration 
creates. 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See infra Part II. 
 196. See infra Appendix. 
 197. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–49 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–87 (2010). 
 198. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
 199. See, e.g., Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting the 
arbitration agreement between Verizon and Verizon customers as follows: “IF FOR SOME 
REASON THE PROHIBITION ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS . . . IS DEEMED 
UNENFORCEABLE, THEN THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WILL NOT APPLY”) This 
would avoid the fear that “when courts hold class-arbitration waivers unconscionable, they are 
essentially turning individual arbitration clauses into class arbitration clauses, changing the 
fundamental nature of what the parties agreed to.” Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 57, at 1168. 
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II.  CONGRUITY AND GOOD POLICY: A THEORY OF “ARBITRATION” AS 
USED IN THE FAA 
 
 Section I of this Article advanced the principle of congruity. 
Arbitration law should be congruous with non-arbitration law. Adhesive 
arbitration agreements should be as enforceable as other adhesion 
contracts. However, this principle of congruity should not be taken to the 
extreme. In a few relatively uncontroversial ways, adhesive arbitration 
agreements should remain more enforceable than other adhesion 
contracts. These exceptions to the congruity principle are good policy and 
necessary to preserve “arbitration” as that term is used in governing law, 
including the FAA, and ordinary speech.  
A.  Relatively Uncontroversial Topics on Which Courts Enforce 
Adhesive Arbitration Agreements More Broadly than Other  
Adhesion Contracts 
While the three topics Section I discusses—contract defenses (the 
separability doctrine), correcting legally erroneous arbitration awards, 
and class waivers—are examples of law enforcing adhesive arbitration 
agreements more broadly than other adhesion contracts, they are not the 
only such examples. They are the controversial examples. They are 
controversial because, on these topics, good policy counsels for treating 
adhesive arbitration agreements like other adhesion contracts—for 
conforming arbitration law to non-arbitration law. To put it another way, 
contract defenses (the separability doctrine), correcting legally erroneous 
decisions of mandatory law, and class waivers are topics on which 
arbitration should not be permitted to compete with litigation. As 
Professor Chris Drahozal and I wrote:  
[A]rbitration and litigation are substitutes for each other. 
Providers of arbitration services—individual arbitrators and 
administering institutions like the American Arbitration 
Association—compete with providers of litigation 
services—courts established by state governments and the 
federal government—as if they are selling competing 
products on a store shelf.200 
This competition between arbitration and litigation should not extend 
to contract defenses, correcting legally erroneous decisions of mandatory 
law, or class waivers. The law should not permit arbitration to attract 
customers with the sales pitch, “Buy our product to avoid contract 
defenses and costly class actions, while negating consumers’ and 
employees’ statutory rights!”  
                                                                                                                     
 200. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 433 (2010). 
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In contrast, the law should permit arbitration to attract customers with 
the sales pitch, “Buy our product so you can, within wide limits, select 
your adjudicator and procedural rules.” Arbitration allows parties more 
freedom to select their adjudicators—the arbitrator(s)—than litigation, 
where the law largely confines parties to the adjudicators—the judge or 
jury—the court system selects.201 Also, arbitration allows parties to 
depart from the rules of civil procedure and evidence that would be 
imposed on them in litigation.202 Parties often choose arbitral rules that 
tend to have less elaborate discovery than in litigation203 and less 
elaborate rules of evidence than in litigation.204 So by forming an 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Of course, parties in litigation have some role in selecting their adjudicators, for 
example, forum shopping of various sorts and peremptory challenges of jurors. 
 202. WARE, supra note 6, § 2.35.  
 203. Id. § 2.36(d); John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract Clauses: A Potential Key to a Cost-
Effective Process, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 9, 9 (many parties are expanding their 
arbitration clauses to “place meaningful limits on discovery”). Many arbitration agreements 
incorporate the rules of an arbitration organization, such as the American Arbitration Association. 
These rules typically do not grant the parties rights to broad discovery but rather grant the 
arbitrator wide discretion in authorizing discovery. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 19–20 (2013). Professor Hensler 
and Professor Linda Demaine conducted a study of consumer arbitration clauses and found:  
Seventeen of the clauses (32.7%) discuss discovery, and eleven (21.2%) discuss 
evidentiary standards. In most instances, these clauses alert consumers that 
discovery may be limited and evidentiary standards may be relaxed by 
comparison to litigation. Twelve of the clauses that address discovery convey 
that discovery may or will be limited. Three state that no discovery will be 
allowed. The remaining two specify that local discovery rules will apply.  
Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 68 
(2004). 
 204. WARE, supra note 6, § 2.37(c). Rules of evidence are historically intertwined with the 
jury. ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 82–84, 243–60 (2001). Thus, it is no 
surprise that arbitration (without a jury) tends to have less elaborate rules of evidence than those 
used in jury trials. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, supra note 203, at 23 (“The arbitrator shall 
determine the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and may exclude 
evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant.”); Stanley Weinstein, An 
Arbitrator’s Wish List, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 54, 57 (2003) (“[I]n most arbitration proceedings 
witnesses can be asked leading questions and testify as to hearsay evidence.”); Sanford F. Young, 
Conventional Wisdoms or Mistakes: The Complaint and the Response, 76 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., 
28, 29 (2004) (“[R]ules of evidence are generally only loosely applied, with hearsay statements 
(including affidavits) and documents usually freely admitted.”). Arbitrators’ general liberality in 
accepting evidence is due in part to the fact that “refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material 
to the controversy” is one of the few grounds for vacating the arbitration award, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10(a)(3) (2012), while hearing evidence that would not be admissible in court is not a ground 
for vacatur. Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013–14 (10th Cir. 
1994) (refusing to vacate the award won by a lawyer who introduced evidence that would not 
have been admissible in litigation); WHD, L.P. v. Mayflower Capital, LLC, 673 S.E.2d 168, 2009 
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arbitration agreement, parties trade away their rights to a jury and, in 
many arbitration agreements, also trade away some rights to discovery 
and to particular rules of evidence.205 
In all these respects, courts generally seem to enforce adhesive 
arbitration agreements more broadly than they enforce other adhesion 
contracts. For example, the FAA requires enforcement of adhesive 
agreements providing for an arbitrator, rather than a jury, in 
circumstances under which at least some courts would not enforce an 
adhesive non-arbitration agreement’s clause requiring a bench trial 
(before a judge) rather than a jury trial.206 And arbitration law generally 
                                                                                                                     
WL 368335, at *5 (N.C. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision) (refusing to vacate an arbitration 
award where the arbitrator may have relied on evidence that would not have been admissible in 
litigation). The study conducted by Professors Hensler and Professor Demaine found 21.2% of 
studied consumer arbitration clauses  
discuss evidentiary standards. In most instances, these clauses alert consumers 
that . . . evidentiary standards may be relaxed by comparison to litigation. . . . 
Three of the clauses that address evidentiary issues state explicitly that neither 
federal nor state procedural or evidentiary rules will apply, and another two state 
that evidentiary standards in arbitration may be less rigorous than in court. Three 
provide that either the Federal Rules of Evidence or state and local rules of 
evidence will apply. The remaining three convey partial evidentiary guidelines 
for the arbitration—for example, by stating that the arbitrator may compel the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at the hearing. 
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 203, at 68. 
 205. See supra notes 165–67, 202–04 and accompanying text.  
 206. Ware, supra note 117, at 81. A few states do not enforce adhesive or other pre-dispute 
contracts requiring a bench trial rather than jury trial, but most do. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 22B-10 (2015) (“Any provision in a contract requiring a party to the contract to waive his right 
to a jury trial is unconscionable as a matter of law and the provision shall be unenforceable. This 
section does not prohibit parties from entering into agreements to arbitrate . . . .”), Grafton 
Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 492 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a pre-dispute 
agreement that any lawsuit between parties would be adjudicated in a court trial, and not by jury 
trial, was unenforceable), and Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994) (holding 
that “pre-litigation contractual waivers of the right to trial by jury are not enforceable”), with In 
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132–33 (Tex. 2004) (“[N]early every state court 
that has considered the issue has held that parties may agree to waive their right to trial by jury in 
certain future disputes, including the supreme courts in Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Nevada, 
and Rhode Island. The same is true of federal courts. . . . We believe this overwhelming weight 
of authority is correct.” (footnotes omitted)). However, some of the courts that do enforce jury-
waiver clauses require them to satisfy a higher standard of consent than the contract-law standards 
of consent in arbitration law. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the 
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 673–
74; Ware, supra note 153, at 197–205 (“In sum, contract-law standards are generally used for the 
waiver of constitutional rights in property-deprivation cases, forum-selection cases, and consent-
to jurisdiction cases, as well as in arbitration cases. Case law governing jury-waiver clauses stands 
out because of its failure to apply contract-law standards of consent and its requirement that 
consent be ‘knowing.’”). 
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enforces adhesive arbitration agreements effectively reducing 
discovery207 and evidentiary rules,208 whereas research revealed no case 
enforcing an adhesive non-arbitration agreement reducing discovery209 or 
evidentiary rules.210   
This disparity between arbitration and litigation should not be 
troubling if, as under the Centrist Position, courts can police arbitration 
agreements for unconscionability. If an adhesive arbitration agreement’s 
choice of arbitrator, discovery limitations, or evidence rules is 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (finding lesser discovery in arbitration an insufficient reason to 
deny enforcement of an adhesive employment arbitration agreement). 
 208. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 209. During litigation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 29 allows the parties to 
“stipulate that . . . other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
29. But research revealed no authority for enforcing pre-dispute, let alone adhesive, non-
arbitration agreements purportedly reducing discovery. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 124, at 
202–03 (discussing post-dispute, but not pre-dispute, agreements to limit discovery); Charles W. 
Tyler, Lawmaking in the Shadow of the Bargain: Contract Procedure as a Second-Best 
Alternative to Mandatory Arbitration, 122 YALE L.J. 1560, 1573 (2013) (“No cases have 
authoritatively addressed whether ex ante contractual provisions limiting the scope of discovery 
or the presentation of evidence in the event of a dispute are enforceable.”). Some commentators 
refer to the possibility “the parties agree ahead of the dispute to . . . limit discovery” without 
discussing whether such an agreement would be enforced. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, 
Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 1475, 1482 (2013); see also Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 
VA. L. REV. 723, 746–47 (2011) (citing only an unpublished draft by Kapeliuk & Klement for the 
proposition that “[a]t the discovery phase, contracts typically limit rather than expand discovery”). 
 210. Courts enforce some post-dispute agreements (often called stipulations) on evidentiary 
matters. See, e.g., Tupman Thurlow Co. v. S.S. Cap Castillo, 490 F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(“[T]he parties stipulated that the contents of the USDA file would be admissible, and these 
documents were contained in that file. Therefore, the documents are admissible.”). However, 
research revealed no examples of courts enforcing pre-dispute agreements, let alone as part of an 
adhesion contract, to alter the rules of evidence. See Henry S. Noyes, supra note 87, at 607–08. 
Although Professor Noyes writes that “ex ante contracts to alter the rules of evidence are 
enforceable,” he cites a criminal case in which the agreement to alter the rules of evidence was 
post-dispute in the sense that the criminal defendant had already been arrested and charged. 
Noyes, supra note 87, at 607 (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 198, 208 n.5 
(1995)). For older cases that support waiver of evidentiary rules through contract, see Note, 
Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 138, 139 (1932). Professor David H. 
Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe wrote that “a contract may specify that evidence in the form of hearsay 
that would otherwise be admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception would be inadmissible unless 
the declarant were unavailable to testify.” David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by 
Contract: A Convoluted Influence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 n.5 (2002) (citing John Kobayashi, Too 
Little, Too Late: Use and Abuse of Innocuous Yet Dangerous Evidentiary Doctrines, in 2 ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION 
TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1127, 1141–45 (1991)). I have not located the 
Kobayashi source, and note that Ms. Cliffe and Professor Taylor do not assert that the “contract” 
avoiding a hearsay exception was or can be a pre-dispute, let alone adhesive, contract. 
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unconscionable then it will not be enforced.211 With that safeguard, 
arbitration should be allowed to compete against litigation by offering 
different adjudicators and different procedural rules on discovery and 
evidence. 
B.  A Theory of “Arbitration” as Used in the FAA: Almost Concepcion  
This view of good arbitration policy is similar to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the FAA in Concepcion, except perhaps on the issue 
central to Concepcion: class waivers. Concepcion interprets FAA § 2 
which says: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.212  
Concepcion said: 
Although [FAA] § 2’s saving clause preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent 
to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. . . . 
                                                                                                                     
 211. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir. 
2005) (holding that limited discovery “could significantly prejudice employees or applicants”); 
Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 F. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
unconscionability based in part on discovery limitations); Murray v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce, and finding 
unconscionable, an employment arbitration agreement where, though the parties ostensibly 
engaged in an alternate strike method to select the single arbitrator from a list of prospective 
arbitrators, they were to exercise these alternate strikes from a list of arbitrators provided by the 
employer); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938–41 (4th Cir. 1999) (deciding under 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, rather than unconscionability); Lucey v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *35–36 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2007) (finding the 
arbitration provision unconscionable in part because of a provision “virtually eliminating 
discovery”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 305 F. App’x 875 (3d Cir. 2009); State ex rel. Vincent 
v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 859, 861 (Mo. 2006) (holding unconscionable a provision stating 
that “[t]he arbitrator shall be selected by the President of the Homebuilders Association of Greater 
St. Louis” (emphasis omitted)); see also Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 
545–47 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (refusing to enforce a nursing home arbitration contract limiting 
depositions to defendant’s expert witnesses); Geiger v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. 
Supp. 2d 985, 996, 999 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding an arbitration provision as void where it only 
allowed one deposition as of right); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601, 614 
(D.S.C. 1998) (holding just one deposition was a “severe discovery limitation[]”); Jara v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 5569, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012) 
(“The limitation of discovery [to two depositions] also renders the agreement substantively 
unconscionable.”). 
 212. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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. . . The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the 
text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability 
of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.  
. . . . 
The point of affording parties discretion in designing 
arbitration processes is to allow efficient, streamlined 
procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be specified, 
for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the 
relevant field . . . . 
. . . Parties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discovery process 
rivaling that in litigation. Arbitration is a matter of contract, 
and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations. 
But what the parties in the aforementioned examples would 
have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, 
lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be required by state 
law.213 
In these passages, Concepcion interprets the FAA’s use of the word 
“arbitration” to refer to a streamlined form of binding adjudication.214 So 
interpreted, the FAA prohibits states from holding unconscionable the 
very procedures that do the streamlining—(1) less discovery, (2) fewer 
evidentiary rules, (3) no jury, and (4) no class actions—because that 
would hold unconscionable the very process the FAA commands courts 
to enforce. 
Contrary to Concepcion, some argue that FAA § 2’s savings clause—
enforcing arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract”—merely prohibits states 
from discriminating against arbitration agreements215 and thus allows 
states to hold unenforceable whatever arbitration agreement provisions 
the state wants, if the state also holds the same provisions unenforceable 
                                                                                                                     
 213. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–45, 351 (citations omitted). 
 214. Id. at 344–46.  
 215. E.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, (No. 09-893), at 7–8 (“Section 2 thus created what is essentially an 
‘equal protection clause’ for contract provisions, such that arbitration agreements would be treated 
at least as well as all other contracts.” (quoting Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable 
Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 43 (2006))); Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s 
Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1265–66 (2011). 
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when they appear in non-arbitration agreements.216 However, 
Concepcion correctly interprets FAA § 2’s use of the word “arbitration” 
to make § 2 more than just a prohibition against discriminating against 
arbitration agreements. “Arbitration” is widely understood to mean a 
form of binding adjudication217 that is not litigation. However, if a state 
could hold unconscionable any agreement for binding adjudication that 
does not use the same procedural and evidentiary rules as litigation and 
the same trier of fact (jury) as litigation, then the so-called “arbitration” 
left enforceable in that state would be too close to litigation to qualify as 
“arbitration” as that term is used in FAA § 2. The only significant 
difference between this so-called “arbitration” and litigation would be 
that the parties would select and pay for the “judge” conducting the jury 
trial under the same rules of procedure and evidence that a 
governmentally selected and paid judge in litigation would use. So § 2 
must be interpreted to prevent states from holding unconscionable 
agreements to use a form of binding adjudication that differs from 
litigation more profoundly than merely selecting and paying for the 
judge.  
How much more profoundly? A form of binding adjudication that 
significantly differs from litigation by having (1) less discovery, (2) fewer 
evidentiary rules, and (3) no jury should be different enough to qualify as 
                                                                                                                     
 216. The California Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in its holding overturned by 
Concepcion. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112–13 (Cal. 2005); see also 
Brief Amici Curiae of Distinguished Law Professors, supra note 215, at 8 n.2 (“For example, a 
state-law rule requiring particularized notice (e.g., minimum font size, boldface type) for jury-
trial waivers in any contract would fall within Section 2’s savings clause because it would be 
‘grounds . . . for the revocation of any contract.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 
 217. “‘Adjudication’ refers to the process by which final, authoritative decisions are rendered 
by a neutral third party who enters the controversy without previous knowledge of the dispute.” 
ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006). “The traditional model of arbitration is precisely that 
of the ‘private tribunal’—private individuals, chosen voluntarily by the parties to a dispute in 
preference to the ‘official’ courts, and given power to hear and ‘judge’ their ‘case.’” Id. at 599; 
see also 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1743 (2009) (describing 
“the adjudicative character of international arbitration, in which the arbitrators are obligated to 
decide the parties’ dispute impartially and objectively, based upon the law and the evidence the 
parties present”); 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.1, at 2:37 n.1 (1994) (“Arbitration is a form of adjudication because the 
parties participate in the decisional process by presenting evidence and reasoned arguments to an 
arbitrator whose final decision should be responsive to the dispute as presented.”); Lon Fuller, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (“[T]he distinguishing 
characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected [disputing] party a 
peculiar form of participation in decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a 
decision in his favor.”). 
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“arbitration,”218 and thus immune from characterization as per se 
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. Concepcion’s interpretation 
of FAA § 2 adds a fourth difference required to be different enough to 
qualify as “arbitration”: (4) no class actions. As stated above, this 
conclusion of Concepcion is plausible as an interpretation of the FAA, 
but, as a matter of policy, I think the enforceability of arbitral class 
waivers ought to conform to non-arbitration law on class waivers. In 
contrast, arbitration law ought to continue departing from non-arbitration 
law by enforcing agreements to use (compared to litigation) less 
discovery, fewer evidentiary rules, and no jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Current law enforces adhesive arbitration agreements more broadly 
than other adhesion contracts in three important and controversial 
respects: contract defenses (the separability doctrine), correction of 
legally erroneous decisions, and class waivers. In contrast, this Article’s 
Centrist Position proposes changes that will on these three topics make 
adhesive arbitration agreements only as enforceable as other adhesion 
contracts. The Centrist Position, however, allows arbitration to maintain 
its relatively uncontroversial distinctions from litigation by enforcing 
arbitration agreements more broadly than non-arbitration agreements 
with respect to jury waivers and rules of discovery and evidence. 
Adoption of the Centrist Position will thus make arbitration law more 
congruous with non-arbitration law while still maintaining arbitration’s 
essential distinctions from litigation.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 218. The combined (federal and state) U. S. court system’s distinctive adjudicator—the civil 
jury—is connected to its distinctive procedures. The United States is the only major nation to 
make extensive use of jury trials in civil cases. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193–94 n.1 (1996) (referring to the abolition of the civil jury 
as “a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago”); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 267 (Tony Weir, trans. 1977); Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 357, 389 (2002); Ware, Consumer, supra note 72, at 868 (“The civil jury 
impacts nearly every aspect of civil litigation in the United States. To give just three examples, 
the civil jury bears a large share of responsibility for: (1) the cost and intrusiveness of U.S. 
discovery; (2) the theatrics of U.S. trials; and (3) the complexity of U.S. evidence law.”). 
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APPENDIX 
A.  Proposed CFPB Rule 
1. Notwithstanding any law or agreement to the contrary: 
a. An agreement between a covered person and a consumer 
for a consumer financial product or service providing for 
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties is 
enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract. 
b. Whether such agreement or ground exists shall, on 
request of a party to such alleged agreement, be 
determined by a court, rather than an arbitrator, 
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration 
challenges the arbitration agreement specifically or in 
conjunction with other terms of the contract containing 
such agreement.   
c. If such agreement requires claims to be brought on an 
individual, rather than class, basis then such requirement 
shall be as enforceable as such a requirement in a non-
arbitration agreement would be under similar 
circumstances. 
2. In addition to other grounds for vacating arbitration awards, a state 
or federal court shall vacate an award arising out of an agreement between 
a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or 
service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties 
where the award was based on the arbitrators’ error of law and, at the time 
of their most recent agreement submitting the controversy to arbitration, 
the parties could not have formed an enforceable contract to avoid such 
law. 
 
Comment: This proposal is intended to overrule (with respect to 
agreements within the Bureau’s jurisdiction) the holding or possible 
implications of the following cases: 
1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
2. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2006). 
3. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 
(2010). 
4. Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576 (2008). 
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5. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 
(2011). 
6. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 
559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
7. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 
S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 
